





































The present work collects three essays on social choice and decision-making in the presence of 
multiple objectives and severe informational limitations. When feasible alternatives must be 
ordered according to their performance under various criteria, it is typically necessary to make 
use of a specific functional relation and assume the implied rates of substitution between scores 
in different criteria. In the special case of collective choice and voting, rather than having proper 
rates of substitution, each individually preferred ordering of the alternatives is usually weighted 
according to its frequency in the population. Both decision frameworks imply the availability of 
extensive information about such functional relation and the proper weights of each criterion or 
must acknowledge a vast and arbitrary discretion to those in charge of resolving the decision 
process. The alternative approach herein discussed consists in applying the Pareto criterion to 
identify Pareto-superior alternatives in each pairwise comparison, a procedure that easily 
produces an incomplete ordering. Then, applying a tool of Order Theory, a complete ordering is 
identified from the linear extensions of the partially ordered set derived from the Pareto criterion. 
The claim is that this method highlights conflicts in value judgements and in incomparable 
criteria, allowing to search for a conflict-mitigating solution that doesn’t make assumptions on 
the reciprocal importance of criteria or judgements. The method is actually a combination of 
existing but unrelated approaches in Social Choice Theory and in Order Theory and provides 
outcomes with interesting properties. The essays present, respectively, an axiomatic discussion 
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1. Policy decisions in the presence of multiple criteria 
In their use of executive power, governments are generally represented as having a set of 
objectives and having determined the course of action that seems more suited to achieve them. 
The idea of a plurality of goals underlying public decision-making is, in fact, consistent with 
centuries of economic theory and normative views on welfare and social justice. Classical 
Utilitarianism and Welfarism, the long-dominant approaches in welfare economics theory before 
Lionel Robbins and the 1930s revolution of ordinal utility (Sen 1995), sought to maximize a 
function of individual utilities, which ultimately corresponds to taking care of the broad, 
subjective notion of individual well-being (Kaplow 2010 p. 347) and its multidimensional 
structure. The new welfare economics tradition (Abram Bergson, Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow), 
which reformed the problem of social welfare around the notion of ordinal utility, still conceived 
tastes and preferences as affecting social welfare and, therefore, justifying the multidimensional 
concerns of a government. Even the more recent political philosophies developed in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century, including the various currents of libertarian and egalitarian 
thinking, are perfectly consistent with multiple government goals. For instance, the self-
interested agents that interact to define policies in a public choice framework are as likely to 
assemble a patchwork of objectives as a good Rawlsian government or a non-welfarist decision-
maker concerned with Sen’s capabilities. At the roots of the modern theory of public finance 
(Musgrave 1959) stand, at the very least, three main drivers of government activity: resource 
allocation to address market failures, income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilization. 
A less uniform picture is that of how different normative approaches deal with decisions made 
in the presence of multiple criteria and goals. Broadly speaking, welfarist approaches adopt 
individual utility or well-being as the synthesis of the consequences produced by all policies 
aimed at all the objectives. Social welfare is then a function (social welfare function) of the utility 
level attained by all the individuals in a society1, under a certain state of the world. Non-welfarist 
approaches devise a number of methods to pursue multiple objectives at the same time and to 
                                                     
1 Specifically, a sum of individual cardinal utilities (classical welfarism), a function of individual ordinal 
utilities (Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function) or a function of individual preference orderings 
determined by individual ordinal utilities (Arrow’s social welfare functions. 
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find which policy is more desirable in this respect. In doing so, they manipulate the arguments 
of the social welfare function or its functional form (or both) in order to fit the normative 
prescription according to which other criteria beyond individual utility affect social welfare. 
Interestingly, while diverging, the paths of welfarist and non-welfarist approaches still have a 
common practical implication: applying either of them to policy analysis requires a precise 
specification of a functional form which ultimately rests on crucial prior knowledge or on purely 
normative assumptions. Those implications are indeed perfectly acceptable under many 
circumstances, but they still should not be taken for granted. Decision-making problems arise 
and, most often, are actually worth of analysis, when complex trade-offs could affect individual 
or social welfare. This is frequently the case with public policies, as long as the space for public 
policy is not confined to cases of unanimity.  Meaningful criteria to assess policies and their 
expected or observed outcomes come in all sorts of measurement units and scales, sometimes 
defying practical attempts to aggregate, other times challenging the logical justification of an 
aggregation. If nothing else, it may be hard to establish beyond reasonable doubt that some 
apparent collective preference over a pair of states of the world should not actually be reversed. 
Complicating things further, the problem may arise at any scale. A local policy on public housing 
wait-lists based on a set of criteria, or one to assign resources to different universities or different 
hospitals based on performance indicators, may pose similar challenges to those implied in 
defining a national policy taking care of growth, social justice and emission reduction.  
The motivation for this thesis comes from noticing that, in the presence of a plurality of objectives, 
policy-making can be affected by major problems of uncertainty and partial information that are 
not necessarily core interests of the multicriteria methods and of the normative approaches that 
are typically adopted in literature. The issue of informational paucity is somewhat conventional 
in Social Choice Theory (Sen 2017; J. Weymark 2013) insofar as some specific information must 
be excluded from a choice rule, like interpersonal comparisons of utility or irrelevant alternatives, 
but there seems to be no explicit attempt of defining what properties may be desirable for decision 
processes taking place under severe informational limitations. 
The attempt made here rests on two arguments. The first is that, after a set of criteria is 
established, any ordering of a set of alternatives (policies, allocations, etc.) can, at a minimum, 
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exploit (Pareto) dominance between pairs of alternatives. This is because each criterion comes 
with an embedded polarity (or direction) determined by the set of underlying objectives. It is a 
fairly standard assumption and the main open questions on it (see for instance Sen 2017 sec. 2) 
should be reconsidered in the light of the partial information context discussed in the remainder 
of this work. However, it is well known that the Pareto dominance criterion does not necessarily 
lead to a complete ordering of all pairs of alternatives (and of the entire set as a consequence). 
Then, the second argument is that the branch of discrete mathematics called Order Theory (Davey 
and Priestley 2002; Schroder 2002; Stanley 2011) has developed a substantial literature on a 
functional relation which, given a certain partially ordered set, identifies one and only one 
complete order with properties that are of notable interest for economic theory. The relation, 
which was first detailed in a work by Peter Winkler (Winkler 1982) but is best described as part 
of a wider approach discussed by a group of authors between the 1980s and the 1990s, has been 
alternatively indicated as average height of an element in a partially ordered set or, particularly in 
some applications, as average rank. Besides some passing remarks in the original body of work2, 
few economic applications have been proposed, and none with a specific underlying link with 
economic theory. The intuition discussed in this work is that the average height of an element in 
a partially ordered set of policies based on the Pareto criterion is a meaningful indicator to 
completely order the set if no reliable information is available beyond what is required to build 
the partially ordered set itself.  
In the following sections I will therefore discuss a possible theoretical justification for the use of 
average height in a partially ordered set to deal with collective choice and policy decisions, 
anchoring it to the existing literature on collective choice and welfare. Furthermore, I will explore 
two applications of this functional relation to fairly standard issues of public economics: waste 
taxation and the identification of the determinants of well-being. The remainder of this work is 
organized as follows. This introductory section will end with a brief overview of the general 
notation and terminology of Order Theory, leaving all the specialized notation for the following 
chapters. In Chapter I, the average height of an element in a partially ordered set is presented as 
                                                     
2 See for instance the introduction of Shepp (1982). 
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the key part of a collective choice rule of which I discuss a simple axiomatic characterization. In 
this case, the ordering criteria consist of voters, individual preference profiles or individual 
families of social welfare functions, along the usual path of social choice theory. The axioms 
highlight the most relevant properties of this functional relation in a social choice framework. In 
the following chapters, the focus shifts from individuals as ordering criteria to ordering criteria 
in general. In Chapter II, the problem of evaluating the performance of municipal waste 
management systems in Italy is considered in the light of the multiple available indicators on one 
hand, and the single indicator being currently used to design an incentive mechanism on the 
other hand. The use of the average height functional relation for the partially ordered set of 
municipalities in the Province of La Spezia allows to evaluate the robustness of performance 
rankings moving from single to multiple performance indicators and the single indicator system 
is shown to have considerably regressive effects on waste taxation. In Chapter III, the OECD 
conceptual model of social indicators expressing national welfare is put to test in order to 
understand if a cross-sectional model of national subjective well-being is more effectively 
specified with such social indictors (and which of them perform better) rather than with GDP 
alone. It is found that the performance of “beyond GDP” indicators is at odds with theory and 
occasionally inconsistent. However, the main emphasis is on the procedure to build the “beyond 
GDP” model, as the average height functional relation is applied to the partial order of OECD 
countries according to indicators that fall within the same domain, in order to identify a synthetic 
indicator with desirable properties. The thesis ends with a brief concluding chapter that sums up 
the findings.  
The content of Chapter II and Chapter III have already been published in two separate journal 
articles and is reported as is3. 
 
                                                     
3 I am author of sections 1, 2, 3, 4 of chapter II and sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the appendices of chapter III. A formal 
declaration of authorship is attached to the present thesis in fulfillment of the Italian legislation. 
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2. An introductory note on binary relations and Order Theory4 
A binary relation on a set 𝐴 is a subset 𝑅 ⊆ 𝐴 × 𝐴 = {(𝑎, 𝑏): 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴}. Therefore, the binary 
relation 𝑅 consists of pairs of elements from 𝐴, and when a certain pair (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑅, we say that 𝑎 
is related to 𝑏 under 𝑅. A frequently adopted convention is to replace (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑅 with the more 
compact notation 𝑎𝑅𝑏. The couple (𝐴, 𝑅) consisting of a set and a binary relation is called relational 
structure and 𝐴 is called the ground set of the relational structure. If the ground set 𝐴 is finite, then 
the relational structure (𝐴, 𝑅) is finite. 
Binary relations of particular interest are classified with respect to the following properties.  
 
I. Reflexivity   (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑅𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴) 
II. Symmetry  (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑅𝑏 → 𝑏𝑅𝑎) 
III. Anti-symmetry  (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑅𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑅𝑎 → 𝑎 = 𝑏) 
IV. Transitivity  (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑅𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑅𝑐 → 𝑎𝑅𝑐) 
V. Completeness  (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑅𝑏 𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑅𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴) 
 
A binary relation 𝑅 that is reflexive and transitive is called a quasi-ordering relation. The 
corresponding relational structure (𝐴, 𝑅) is called a quasi-ordered set5. A symmetric quasi-ordering 
is an equivalence relation. An anti-symmetric quasi-ordering is an order relation. If an order relation 
is complete, it is called linear order relation.  
From a binary relation 𝑅 it is usually convenient to define three parts of particular relevance. The 
asymmetric part of 𝑅 is indicated with 𝑃 and is obtained by setting 𝑎𝑃𝑏 iff 𝑎𝑅𝑏 and ¬(𝑏𝑅𝑎). The 
symmetric part is indicated as 𝑎𝐼𝑏 and is defined by setting 𝑎𝑅𝑏 ↔ 𝑏𝑅𝑎. The incomparability part is 
indicated as 𝑎||𝑏 and comes from setting ¬(𝑎𝑅𝑏) and ¬(𝑏𝑅𝑎). Intuitively, incomparability arises 
when a binary relation is incomplete and is absent when the binary relation satisfies 
completeness. Therefore, the difference between an order relation and a linear order relation is 
                                                     
4 The content of this section is assembled from authoritative sources on binary relations and Order Theory including Stanley (2011) 
Schroder (2002), Davey and Priestley (2002), Foldes (1994). 
5 We conventionally assume that the properties of an order relation are not distinct from the properties of the ordered set equipped 
with that order relation. 
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that the former may imply incomparability between some pairs of elements in the ground set 
whereas the latter presents no incomparability. 
Order relations are a particularly pervasive kind of binary relations and they are frequently 
denoted by the specialized symbol ≤ in place of the generic symbol of relation 𝑅. The effect of 
order relations on sets is to introduce a hierarchic structure so that 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 is interpreted as 𝑎 is less 
than or equal to 𝑏 or, equivalently, 𝑏 is greater than or equal to 𝑎. Correspondingly, the 
asymmetric part of the order relation is the strict order 𝑎 < 𝑏, the symmetric part is the equality 
𝑎 = 𝑏 where 𝑎 and 𝑏 denote the same object. Transitivity and anti-symmetry together exclude 
from order relations any possibility to find cycles of the kind 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑎2 ≤ ⋯ .≤ 𝑎𝑛 ≤ 𝑎1 for all 
distinct 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛. The relational structure (𝐴, ≤), which consists of the ground set 𝐴 and an 
order relation on it, is called ordered set or, more frequently, partially ordered set or poset, to 
emphasize that only in the special case of a complete order relation all pairs 𝑎, 𝑏 of elements in 𝐴 
are also in the order relation, either as 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 or as 𝑏 ≤ 𝑎. Partially ordered sets constitute the main, 
although not the only relational structures used throughout this thesis.    
Before presenting some key findings in Order Theory that play a role in the following chapters, 
it is opportune to remind the reader that additional naming and notation conventions are 
extensively used in literature and are adopted when required in this thesis. In cases where there 
is no possible confusion, it is common to use the same letter (e.g. 𝐴) to indicate a partially ordered 
set as well as its ground set. When multiple binary relations satisfying the same properties are in 
use on the same ground set, they may be indexed to keep track of the differences. When multiple 
binary relations satisfying different properties are in use instead, then the specialized notation ≤ 
for order relations may be replaced with one more apt at highlighting the different types of binary 
relations and the term 𝑅 is typically reserved for order relations in general. In extensive 
discussions concerning a binary relation, it is customary to indicate with 𝑅(𝐴) the binary relation 
over set 𝐴 which is the counterpart of the ordered set (𝐴, 𝑅). These conventions are frequently 
found in Social Choice Theory and I adopt them in particular in Chapter I. 
I conclude this brief overview with some classical results in the study of partial orders that 
constitute the starting point for the functional relation I already mentioned as developed by 
Winkler and others and that is the main method of choice for the thesis. The results encompass 
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what is broadly known as the field of extension theorems because the main point consists in 
defining how order relations can be extended by introducing new elements to the subset 𝑅 of the 
Cartesian product 𝐴 × 𝐴.  
The first result is that any order can be added an additional comparability of previously 
incomparable elements (Schroder 2002, Lemma 10.1), which is to say that if 𝑅 is an order relation 
on a ground set 𝐴, 𝑎, 𝑏 are two distinct elements of the ground set and (𝑎, 𝑏) ∉ 𝑅, then there is an 
order 𝑅’ on 𝐴 that contains every pair included in 𝑅 and (𝑎, 𝑏). In this sense we can say that 𝑅′ 
contains 𝑅 or, using a terminology that is more frequent in a different literature, that it is 
compatible with 𝑅. The structure of the set of all orders that contain a given 𝑅 is particularly 
important: when ordered by inclusion, it is itself an ordered set and it is conditionally complete, 
with all maximal elements represented by linear orders. Following a classical theorem (Szpilrajn 
1930) it is known that every element in this “ordered set of orders” stands below a maximal 
element and it is therefore possible to conclude that every order is contained in a linear order.  
From the above it is then possible to derive the definition of linear extension of a partially ordered 
set (𝐴, 𝑅) as a relational structure (𝐴, 𝐿), a linearly ordered set where 𝐿 is a linear order and 
contains 𝑅 . From Szpilrajn’s theorem also descends a result due to Dushnik and Miller (1941) 
which says that if a partially ordered set 𝐴 contains non-comparable elements, then for every non 
comparable pair 𝑎, 𝑏 there exist an extension 𝑅1  in which 𝑎𝑅1𝑏 and an extension 𝑅2 in which 𝑏𝑅2𝑎. 
Finally, every partial order is the intersection of the linear orders that extend it, that is, the 
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Consider the following and rather common circumstance. A collective choice supposed to emerge 
from the individual preferences of a population over a set of alternatives will have to be made on 
incomplete preference information. Obviously, the nature of the incompleteness is crucial in 
evaluating the opportune approaches to this kind of problem, and yet there is a number of 
different cases in which partial information leads to the same kind of logical set-up. For instance, 
suppose that, in a typical voting environment, a sufficiently large part of the relevant population 
is not in condition to express its preferences or that observed preferences belong to a subset of the 
population that represents all opinions but not proportionally. If we move outside the voting 
environment, just suppose that individual preferences are fully available but information on their 
intensity, which is supposed to matter in this particular collective choice environment, are not. 
This chapter is concerned with three recurring elements of the examples above. First, given a set 
of alternatives, there is no rule aggregating individual preferences over those alternatives6 that 
can reflect a preference ordering if it doesn’t appear at least once in the population. Second, a 
preference profile that is observed at least once is unquestionably relevant for the identification 
of a collective preference because it exists in the population but, under some conditions, available 
information on its frequency may be irrelevant and misleading. Finally, if both the first and the 
second point hold as relevant for the case of interest, some important collective choice rules like 
majority voting or the plurality rule are certainly not appropriate. If that is the case, each pair of 
alternatives might still be subject to a meaningful collective ordering or might instead be 
incomparable following the conventional Pareto principle. In other words, the social preference 
could be incomplete7.  
Social choice theory has discussed a number of collective choice rules in which the social 
preference can be incomplete while satisfying some form of the Pareto principle. At the same 
time, a number of extension theorems have been studied and developed in the context of choice 
                                                     
6 We assume the standard Arrovian setting in which individual preferences are represented by linear order relations 
over the set of feasible alternatives. 
7 See pg. 13. 
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theory8 to represent the relation between incomplete and complete orders sharing a portion of 
the information embedded in each, including the well-known Pareto extension rule (Sen 2017). 
The goal of this chapter is to propose a collective choice rule that extends the quasi-ordering 
defined by the Pareto principle to a complete order exploiting some interesting tools of order 
theory. Such a rule has peculiar properties that descend from working with the linear extensions 
of a partially ordered set related with the Pareto quasi-ordering and, furthermore, from treating 
them in a way that is interpretable as identifying and dealing with conflicts that generate 
mutually exclusive but reasonable and complete collective preferences. I define the property of a 
collective choice rule of this kind balanced conflict mitigation. 
The chapter assumes that cases of partial information as those mentioned above should be taken 
as compelling motivation for exploiting observed individual preferences, but not the frequencies 
of observed preferences, to build a collective choice rule. Collective preferences are then 
determined as the expected position of each alternative in a linear order as if such order was 
randomly selected among those that are compatible with a partially ordered set that directly 
derives from the Pareto quasi-ordering. If the set of alternatives is finite, the probability of 
drawing a linear order in which a pair 𝑎, 𝑏 of alternatives is ordered so that 𝑎 is preferred to 𝑏 is 
not independent of the preferences on any other pair. When that is not the case, the probability 
of finding 𝑎 preferred to 𝑏 is going to be correlated with preferences over other pairs, a result that 
is discussed in detail in a specific area of research on order theory 
In fact, the study of the connections between correlation and order in Order Theory was a major 
area of research in the 1980s and the 1990s. The field was strongly indebted with the FKG theorem 
of statistical physics (Fortuin et al. 1971) which, in a very simple form, states that increasing events 
are positively correlated. Extensive reviews of these results in what was identified as the theme 
of correlation inequalities can be found in Fishburn (1992), in Trotter (1995) and, succinctly but with 
specific reference to the area of interest of this chapter, in Brightwell and Trotter (2002).   
In 1980, Rival and Sands formulated the following conjecture (XYZ conjecture) which is strictly 
related to our problem: given 𝑛 random variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛, with independent and uniform 
                                                     
8 For a brief overview, see Duggan (1999) 
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distribution, and given partial information on the “true ordering” of such variables 𝛤 =
{𝑥2 < 𝑥3, 𝑥9 < 𝑥7…}, it seems plausible that, for any 𝛤, 
 
𝑃(𝑥1 < 𝑥2| 𝛤) ≤ 𝑃(𝑥1 < 𝑥2| 𝛤, 𝑥1 < 𝑥3) 
 
The conjecture was later proved by Shepp (1982) using the FKG theorem and, in its strict form, 
by Fishburn (1984) using a generalization of the same theorem. Remarkably, the motivating 
example by Shepp in his otherwise strictly theoretical paper is concerned with the ordering of 
incomes, which is suggestive of potential applications in terms of welfare and Social Choice. In 
the same year of Shepp’s paper, a work by Winkler (1982) discussed a number of properties 
deriving from the XYZ conjecture, among which the formal definition of the concept of average 
height of an element 𝑥 in a partially ordered set as the expected number of elements below 𝑥 in a 
random linear extension of the partially ordered set. The results of Shepp and Winkler provide 
this chapter with the basic tool to define a collective ordering from non-unanimous individual 
orderings.  
It is interesting to remark that order theory is almost ubiquitous in economics and partially 
ordered sets have a notable role in Social Choice Theory9 but the link with correlation is only 
sparingly considered, if at all, in economic theory or in Social Choice Theory. However, in recent 
empirical literature, the interest for correlation inequalities and in particular for the concept of 
average height (or average rank) has apparently resurfaced in a somewhat disorderly fashion, 
first in literature concerned with ecological and environmental statistics as in Lerche and 
Sørensen (2003), in Patil and Taillie (2004) and in Bruggemann and Patil (2010). Mostly at a later 
stage, correlation inequalities have also occasionally been used in works that look at decision 
theory (Al-Sharrah 2010), at economic and social statistics (Caperna and Boccuzzo 2018; di Bella 
et al. 2018; Fattore 2016) and at economics (Badinger and Reuter 2015, 2017; Cavalletti and Corsi 
2018). In most cases, the emphasis is on applications of average rank in a partially ordered set and 
the properties of this function are not discussed in the context of economic theory. A few works 
                                                     
9 Although perhaps less so than quasi-orderings and weak orders as a consequence of considering ties as a desirable 
feature to model preference relations 
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dealing with Social Choice Theory and Voting Theory have discussed choice methods that exploit 
linear extensions of partially ordered sets to aggregate preferences. In Ackerman et al. (2013), 
individual preferences are expressed with respect to different characteristics of each alternative, 
with motivations that remind of Lancaster’s utility model (Lancaster 1966). In that case, 
individual preferences are partially ordered and, among the proposed methods to aggregate 
them, one is to apply any voting method to the set of all linear extensions extracted from 
individual partially ordered preferences as if they were all ballots. This approach is related with 
Winkler’s average height, as the authors explain, but makes full use of frequency information and 
assume that incompleteness descends from individual preferences that violate standard 
rationality assumptions rather than from non-unanimity and the Pareto principle. Furthermore, 
some works dealing with automated decisions and computational social choice have discussed 
approaches to preference aggregations in the presence of incomplete information and possibly 
based on applying some voting procedure on the set of all complete extensions of an incomplete 
collective preference (Konczak and Lang 2005; Pini et al. 2007, 2008) but with goals that are 
different from those underlying this chapter. 
Based on this brief overview, a discussion on the properties of Winkler’s average height could 
provide economic theory with an additional tool to deal with specific aggregation problems. 
Approaching it from the point of view of Social Choice Theory seems a logical strategy as the 
problem of incomplete preferences (and that of partial information on preferences, in particular) 
is a known issue that the most commonly considered collective choice rules seem ill-designed to 
deal with. Previous works that use linear extensions in the context of choice, as well as the 
structure itself of Winkler’s average height in a partially ordered set, suggest the opportunity of 
using the notation and classification conventions of positional choice rules (Pattanaik 2002). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the notation and some 
preliminary definitions. Section 3 translates Winkler’s average height into the appropriate 
notation for a positional choice rule. Section 4 presents the axioms that are relevant for a collective 
choice rule based on Winkler’s average height and, afterwards, it provides the characterization 
of such collective choice rule as the one that extends the strong Pareto quasi-ordering and satisfies 
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the axiom of balanced conflict mitigation; finally, it presents an example comparing the proposed 
collective choice rule with other standard rules of preference aggregation. 
 
2. Notation and definitions 
2.1 Preliminaries 
For notation definitions and, consequently, for much of the content of this paragraph, I closely 
follow Pattanaik (2002) on positional choice rules. 
Therefore, 𝑁 is the set of all non-negative integers, 𝑵 is the class of all non-empty subsets of 𝑁 
and the elements 𝑆, 𝑆′, …  ∈ 𝑵 are called societies. Each element in a society is an individual 𝑖. The 
universal set of alternatives is indicated with 𝑋 and 𝑿 is the class of all non-empty subsets of 𝑋 
while the elements 𝐴, 𝐴′, …  ∈ 𝑿 are called issues. For any 𝐴 ∈ 𝑿, 𝑽(𝐴),𝑾(𝐴), 𝑹(𝐴), 𝑳(𝐴) indicate, 
respectively, the set of all reflexive binary relations over 𝐴, the set of all reflexive and complete 
binary relations over 𝐴, the set of all orderings over 𝐴 and the set of all linear orderings over 𝐴. 
For all 𝐴 ∈ 𝑿, every 𝑅(𝐴) ∈ 𝑽(𝐴) is interpreted as a weak preference relation over 𝐴, such that 
𝑥𝑅(𝐴)𝑦 indicates that 𝑥 is weakly preferred to 𝑦 in the weak ordering of 𝐴. Following the typical 
conventions, the asymmetric part of such relations is indicated as 𝑃(𝐴) and the symmetric part 
as 𝐼(𝐴).  
When 𝐴 = 𝑋, the notation 𝑽,𝑾,𝑹, 𝑳, 𝑅, 𝑃, 𝐼 replaces 𝑽(𝐴),𝑾(𝐴), 𝑹(𝐴), 𝑳(𝐴), 𝑅(𝐴), 𝑃(𝐴), 𝐼(𝐴).  
For the sake of convenience, order relations in a general sense and incomplete order relations will 
both be indicated with 𝑅 and strictly incomplete order relations will be signaled by specific 
notation accents. In that case, ‖(𝐴) and ‖ will stand for the incomparable part of the relation 
respectively over 𝐴 and over the universal set of alternatives.  
Conventionally, I assume rational individual preferences to be represented by complete orders 
over the universal set of alternatives. For any 𝑆 ∈ 𝑁 and all non-empty subsets 𝑾′of 𝑾, I indicate 
with 𝑾′𝑺 the #S-fold Cartesian product of 𝑾′. Each element  𝑅𝑆, 𝑅𝑆
′ , … of 𝑾𝑺 stands for an #S-tuple 
of individual preference profiles 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑖, … , 𝑅𝑛, one for each of the 𝑛 individuals that are part 
of society 𝑆. I indicate each 𝑅𝑆 with the generic term preference profile to clarify that I am 
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considering the preferences of multiple individuals. With 𝐷(𝑾′) I concisely indicate the set of 
all (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) for which 𝑆 ∈ 𝑵, 𝐴 ∈ 𝑿, 𝑅𝑆 ∈ 𝑾
′𝑺.  
Before moving forward, some basic definitions are required to provide a formal introduction and 
some taxonomy to the problem of collective choice that will be discussed in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
 
Definition 2.1 (Sen 2017, Definition 2*1) A Collective Choice Rule (CCR) is a functional relation 
𝑓 such that for any  𝑅𝑆 ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′𝑺) identifies one and only one social preference 𝑅 =
𝑓(𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑖, … , 𝑅𝑛).  
 
Definition 2.2 (Pattanaik 2002, Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) A Social Ranking Rule (SRR) is a 
function 𝑓 which, for every (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) identifies one and only one 𝑅(𝐴) ∈ 𝑽(𝐴), with 𝑾′ 
being some non-empty and balanced subset of 𝑾. We indicate this with 𝑅(𝐴) = 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠). A 
Social Ranking Rule is called Social Ordering Rule (SOR) if and only if for every (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈
𝐷(𝑾′), 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) is an ordering over 𝐴. 
 
3 Average height in a partially ordered set 
The average height function described in Winkler (1982) and mentioned, for instance, in Shepp 
(1982), Brightwell and Winkler (1991) and Brightwell and Trotter (2002) has two noticeable 
features: it is based on a notion of height that is directly related to that of rank in positional rules 
and, furthermore, its domain consists of a partially ordered set. Both points deserve a brief 
discussion. 
I first recall a standard definition of rank (or position) of an alternative 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 in a preference 
ordering 𝑅 as  
 




where #𝐴 indicates the cardinality of 𝐴. This definition is canonically interpreted as referred to 
complete orders only. Outside of those, the definition is ambiguous and may only be applicable, 
for instance, to the very restricted class of partially ordered sets called graded posets (Stanley 2011). 
By the end of this chapter I will make use of the average height function to effectively generalize 
the notion of rank to any partially ordered set and, specifically, to partial orders that directly 
descend from Pareto quasi-orderings. 
The second point to be discussed revolves around the fact that the domain of the average height 
function is not uniquely identified by a preference profile. Specifically, it is easy to see that, for 
all (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′), any 𝑅(𝐴) = 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) is an acceptable domain for the average height 
function as long as it is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. Consequently, from definitions 
2.1 and 2.2, it is clear that a straightforward application of Winkler’s function cannot be a CCR or 
a SRR. For the moment, I will assume that ?̇?(𝐴) indicates the set of all reflexive, transitive and 
anti-symmetric binary relation over 𝐴 and that ?̇?(𝐴) ∈ ?̇?(𝐴) is the partially ordered social 
preference over 𝐴 that constitutes the domain of the average height function. In the following 
section, I will discuss ?̇?(𝐴) in greater detail.  
Let ?̇?(𝐴) denote the set of all linear extensions ?̇?1, ?̇?2, … , ?̇?#?̇?(𝐴) of ?̇?(𝐴) over 𝐴.  
  
Definition 3.1 (Height of an alternative). For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′), ?̇?(𝐴) ∈ ?̇?(𝐴) and 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴, the 
height  𝐻𝑥 of 𝑥 is defined as the random variable of value 𝑓(𝑥) such that 𝑓 is a random linear 
extension ?̇?(𝐴) ∈ ?̇?(𝐴), and 𝑓(𝑥) is given by #{𝑗 ∈ 𝐴: 𝑥?̇?(𝐴)𝑗} + 1. 
 
The relation between 𝐻𝑥 and the previously mentioned definition of rank is trivial. Remarkably, 
the distribution of 𝐻𝑥 is unimodal (Stanley 1981).  
 
Definition 3.2 (Average height of an alternative). For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′), ?̇?(𝐴) ∈ ?̇?(𝐴) and 𝑥 ∈












A second formulation of (2) is possible, in which the probabilistic intuition behind this measure 
is made more explicit, as ℎ𝑥 is essentially the expected value 𝐸(𝐻𝑥) of the height of 𝑥 in a 
randomly selected linear extension. Let ?̇?𝐻𝑥=𝑙 = {?̇?(𝐴) ∈ ?̇?(𝐴): 𝐻𝑥 = 𝑙}. Then 
 
 











In (3), the probability of finding 𝑥 at a given 𝐻𝑥 in a randomly selected linear extension of ?̇?(𝐴) 
corresponds to the ratio between the number of linear extensions in which 𝑥 holds that position 
and the number of all linear extensions.  
Finally, the following interesting property of ℎ𝑥 has been demonstrated by De Loof et al. (2011)  
 
 










In (4), the average height of 𝑥 is obtained as 1 plus the ratio of linear extensions in which 𝑥 is 
above each other element 𝑗 in the set. It should be noted that the problem of counting #?̇?(𝐴) has 
been demonstrated to be #P-complete (Brightwell and Winkler 1991). However, a number of 
approximations, for #?̇?(𝐴) in general and for ℎ𝑥 specifically, are available in literature 
(Brüggemann et al. 2004; Brüggemann and Annoni 2014; Bubley and Dyer 1999; De Loof et al. 
2011)   
 
4. Characterization of a Pareto-extension rule based on ℎ𝑥 
4.1 The strong Pareto rule and the Pareto extension rules 
From this point, I consider some properties that may be desirable in an aggregation procedure 
that goes from several individual preferences to one collective preference. The purpose of this 
work is better served by making a distinction between two groups of axioms. The first group is 
known to provide a social quasi-ordering of alternatives that has some opportune qualities but, 
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among a number of limitations, it is typically incomplete. What follows is required to extend the 
previous social quasi-ordering into an ordering satisfying some additional properties of interest, 
at the price of losing some that were satisfied by the quasi-ordering. 
The first group includes the following axioms, all of which are usually contemplated in the debate 
about the basic requirements of a CCR. 
 
Unrestricted Domain. A CCR 𝑓 satisfies Unrestricted Domain if and only if the domain of the 
aggregation function is the set of all possible preference profiles 𝑾𝑺.  
 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′), a collective choice rule 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) 
satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives if and only if [𝑅𝑆/𝐴 = 𝑅𝑆




Strong Pareto Principle. For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′), a collective choice rule 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) satisfies the 
strong Pareto Principle if and only if  
 
a) 𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑦, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 → 𝑥𝑅𝑦 and 
b) [𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑦, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑆: 𝑥𝑃𝑖𝑦] → 𝑥𝑃𝑦 
 
Anonymity. For every permutation 𝜎 on {1, 2, … , 𝑛} and every 𝑅𝑆 ∈ 𝑾
𝑺,  𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) =  𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝜎(𝑠)). 
 
It is well known that these four axioms characterize the strong Pareto rule. 
 
Definition 4.1 (strong Pareto rule) 
The strong Pareto rule is a CCR such that, for all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) 
 




Theorem 1 (Weymark 1984): if a CCR 𝑓 satisfies Unrestricted Domain, Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, the strong Pareto Principle and Anonymity, then 𝑓 is the strong Pareto rule. 
 
The quasi-ordering determined by the strong Pareto rule (or strong Pareto quasi-ordering) has 
been extensively discussed in literature and requires no further comment, except for remarking 
that its incompleteness represents the most obvious of its limitations as a method of collective 
choice. However, in the context of CCRs that seek a departure as limited as possible from the set 
of conditions in Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem (Arrow 1962), weakening the rationality 
condition of completeness for admissible social rankings is an important case.  
The desirable properties of orderings, if compared to the less appealing quality of quasi-orderings 
of presenting at least a maximal element in the set (Sen 2017) provide some context for the interest 
of Social Choice Theory for CCRs that are complete or more complete than the Pareto relation 
and that satisfy either the strong Pareto Principle or the Weak Pareto Principle at the expense of 
other conditions. A vast spectrum of actual choice problems are ordinarily addressed with CCRs 
that fall in this category. The following lemma, a generalization of the Szpilrajn extension theorem 
to quasi-orderings, provided the framework to look at CCRs that result in complete social 
rankings that are compatible (Sen 2017, Definition 1*6) with the Pareto quasi-ordering as 
extensions of it. 
 
Arrow’s Lemma (1951, pp. 64-68): let ?̈? be a quasi-ordering over 𝐴, let 𝐵 be a subset of 𝐴 such 
that {𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐵: (𝑥, 𝑦) ∉  ?̈?, 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦} and 𝑇 be an ordering over 𝐵. Then, there exist an extension 𝑅 
of ?̈? such that the restriction of 𝑅 on 𝐵 coincides with 𝑇.     
 
Well-known CCR that extend the Pareto quasi-ordering into an ordering without further 
manipulation of the Arrovian axioms listed above are the proper Pareto-extension rules. They 
require the weakening of another condition of social rationality, that of transitive collective 
preferences, into quasi-transitivity. I report the definition of the Pareto-extension rule and the 




Definition 4.2 (Pareto-extension rule) 
The Pareto-extension rule is a CCR such that, for all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐴: 𝑥𝑅𝑦 ↔ [𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑦, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆  ˅ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑆: 𝑥𝑃𝑖𝑦] 
 
Theorem 3*5 (Sen 1970) 
A CCR with range 𝑅 corresponding to the set of complete, reflexive and quasi-transitive relations 
of 𝐴, satisfying unlimited domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, the strong Pareto 
Principle and anonymity is the necessary and sufficient condition for being the Pareto-extension 
rule. 
 
Pareto-extension rules have been discussed in relation with unanimity as a crucial normative 
foundation for social choice, but their drawbacks were already at the center of the discussion in 
the same work in which the Pareto-extension rules were first characterized (Sen 1970, Theorem 
5*3). In fact, the Pareto-extension rule resolves into arbitrarily imposing social indifference over 
alternatives on which there is no agreement and are therefore Pareto-incomparable, and this is 
equivalent to excluding distributional concerns from the formation of a collective preference. 
 
4.2 Axioms and definitions for a Pareto-extension rule based on ℎ𝑥 
It has been argued in many instances across the literature on Social Choice Theory that the effects 
of combinations of conditions on the various CCR ultimately suggest a number of conflicts among 
attractive properties (among which the most famous is the Arrovian impossibility itself). This is 
obviously the case when comparing the strong Pareto rule and the Pareto-extension rule, which 
leads to question when it might be more acceptable for a CCR to potentially yield incomplete 
social preferences or, rather, complete social preferences that might be no more than quasi-
transitive and are indifferent in case of disagreement among individuals. The point, however, has 
an even more general relevance. The same kind of conflict between the Pareto-extension rule and 
the strong Pareto rule is potentially attached to any rule extending the Pareto quasi-ordering and, 
consequently, to the set of properties emerging from its characterization. In this sense, the 
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operation of extending the Pareto quasi-ordering to a linear order implies the larger problem of 
all conflicting linear extensions that are compatible with the Pareto quasi-ordering. 
From the standpoint of collective choice rules, this may be an interesting issue when the available 
information is indeed in the form of a quasi-ordering for the lack of agreement and the lack of 
information required to satisfyingly resolve disagreements, but collective choice must 
nonetheless have the form of a complete order. In such a case, choice may take a form that could 
be defined as conflict mitigation. In a conflict-mitigating process, individual preferences are 
considered, an incomplete collective preference is identified, conflicts between the different 
possible complete orders become apparent and some prudential strategy is identified to resolve 
them.  
The following axioms provide a definition of the conflict mitigation property and other properties 
that may be attractive in such circumstances. The formal structure of the axioms is directly 
derived from Fattore (2017) where it is cast in the framework of the axiomatic treatment of 
functionals on POSETS. The general point is that a desirable property of functionals on POSETS 
is to behave consistently on every order relation specified on a given ground set as the relation 
changes, starting from the linear orders over the ground set where the application of the 
functional is trivial. A consistent functional can then be defined as one such that the values it 
assumes over any subset of all the linear orders over the ground set and the value on the POSET 
obtained as an intersection of the linear orders in such subset are in a functional relation. 
 
Conflict mitigation. For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) and all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐴, a social ordering rule 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) =
𝑅(𝐴) satisfies conflict mitigation with respect to a relevant reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric 
sub-relation ?̇?(𝐴) if and only if  
 






 𝑟 (𝑥, ?̇?(𝐴)) = 𝑔 (𝑟 (𝑥,  ?̇?1(𝐴)) , 𝑟 (𝑥,  ?̇?2(𝐴)) , … , 𝑟 (𝑥,  ?̇?#?̇?(𝐴)(𝐴))) (6) 
 
where (5) institutes a relation between the ordering defined by 𝑓 and specifically one partial order 
of the alternatives, by the means of the ranking of the alternatives in 𝐴 according to such 
subrelation and (6) provides a necessary generalization of the notion of rank which is usually 
defined only for linear orderings (Pattanaik 2002, p. 368). The ranking functional is consistent if 
rankings of alternative 𝑥 in all the linear extensions of ?̇?(𝐴) are associated to the ranking of 𝑥 
in ?̇?(𝐴) by means of function 𝑔.   
Following Fattore (2017), it is possible to make a more stringent version of the axiom by noting 
that function 𝑔 has a major role in shaping the conflict-mitigating social ordering rule and it seems 
therefore reasonable to introduce the desirable form of 𝑔 within the condition. 
 
Balanced conflict mitigation. For all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) and all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐴, a social ordering 
rule 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) = 𝑅(𝐴) that satisfies conflict mitigation with respect to a relevant subrelation ?̇?(𝐴) 
is balanced if and only if the functional relation 𝑔 between the ranks of any element 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 in ?̇?(𝐴) 
and the ranks of 𝑥 in the linear extensions of ?̇?(𝐴) satisfies the following and well known 
properties: continuity in each of its arguments, decomposability, strict monotonicity, homogeneity in 
its arguments and traslativity. 
 
For the sake of clarity, I provide a formal definition of each of these (anyway rather standard) 
conditions on 𝑔 before providing the interpretation of the axiom. 
 
Continuity. A function 𝑔 of 𝑛 variables is continuous if and only if, for any point (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) in 








Decomposability. A function 𝑔 is decomposable if and only if, for all 𝑚, 𝑛 = 1, 2, … and for all 
vectors 𝒙 ∈ [0,1]𝑚 and 𝒚 ∈ [0,1]𝑛, 
 




Strict Monotonicity. Let 𝒙, 𝒚 indicate two k-dimensional real vectors; function 𝑔 is strictly 
monotone if and only if 𝒙 < 𝒚 in the product order10 over ℝ𝑘implies 𝑔𝑘(𝒙) < 𝑔𝑘(𝒚). 
 
Homogeneity. A function 𝑔 is homogeneous if and only if, for any real number 𝑐 ∈ [0,1] and any 
k-dimensional real vector 𝒙 = (𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, … , 𝒙𝒌) it is verified that 𝑔(𝑐 ∙ 𝒙) = 𝑐 ∙ 𝑔(𝒙). 
 
Traslativity. A function 𝑔 is traslative if and only if for any real number 𝑐 and any pair of k-
dimensional real vectors 𝒙 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘), 𝒄 = (𝑐, 𝑐 … , 𝑐) it is verified that 𝑔(𝒙 + 𝒄) = 𝑔(𝒙) + 𝑐. 
  
In a balanced conflict-mitigating social ordering rule (BCMR), the ranking over the partial order 
is a function of the rankings over its linear extensions; sufficiently small changes11 in the rankings 
of an alternative in the linear extensions produce arbitrarily small changes in the ranking of that 
alternative over the partial order and strictly better rankings of an alternative across all linear 
extensions imply a strictly better ranking of that alternative in the partial order. All these 
properties have either been discussed above or provide rather self-explaining advantages to a 
collective choice procedure. The property of decomposability states that the social ordering rule 
produces the same results if the function over the linear extensions is applied separately over 
partitions of the set of all the linear extensions and, again, on the results. As a consequence, 
conflict mitigation can be interpreted as a choice process in which it is possible to transparently 
assess the contribution of any group of potential outcomes to the overall outcome. The final two 
                                                     
10 For product order, consider the following conventional definition: let 𝐴𝑖 be a set partially ordered by order 
relation ≥𝑖, with 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛. If 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ ∏ 𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , then 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦 should be interpreted as 𝑥𝑖 ≥𝑖 𝑦𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 and  𝑥 > 𝑦 
that 𝑥 > 𝑦 and 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦. The order ≥ on ∏ 𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is called product order. 
11 That is, ignoring the inevitable granularity of rank values, which is fixed, whereas the set of all linear extensions of 
a partially ordered set can be arbitrarily large, much like the ground set involved.  
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properties provide a stricter regulation of change in the ranking of an alternative over the partial 
order as a consequence of changes in its rankings in the linear extensions. The property of 
traslativity ensures that, in a BCMR, a unit increase (or decrease) in the ranking of an alternative 
in all the compatible linear orders leads to a corresponding unit change in the ranking over the 
partial order. Changes that amount to strictly more than a unit per linear extension, therefore, 
produce changes of more than a unit in the partial order. Equivalently, by homogeneity, for an 
alternative to get a halved standing in all linear extensions exactly implies having a halved 
standing in the partial order. Both properties can be interpreted as technical conditions but they 
may nonetheless be desirable in many circumstances, particularly when the steps of conflict 
mitigation (identifying a partial order of preferences and then extending it) are separated by a 
non-trivial amount of time and/or additional information becomes available. For instance, the 
property of traslativity shifts a balanced conflict-mitigating ordering by 𝑐 after the introduction 
(or the removal) of 𝑐 strictly better or strictly worse alternatives. Therefore, partially ordered 
preferences over two disjoint sets of alternatives of this kind can be ordinally summed12 and the 
ranking of an alternative in the resulting poset will be equal to its ranking in the poset of origin 
plus or minus the cardinality of the other poset. The property of homogeneity, instead, helps 
comparing a conflict-mitigating allocation of a budget among projects that are partially ordered 
and the various allocations implied by the compatible linear orders.  
I close this section by providing the opportune definitions for a Pareto-extension rule based on 
correlation inequalities. Let ?̈?(𝐴) indicate the strong Pareto quasi-ordering over alternatives in 
issue 𝐴 and let 𝐼(̈𝐴) indicate the reflexive, transitive, symmetric sub-relation of ?̈? over 𝐴. 
Following a conventional notation, I indicate with 𝐴/𝐼 ̈the quotient set of 𝐼(̈𝐴) or, in other terms, 
the set of all equivalence classes {[𝑥], [𝑦], … } of 𝐴 with respect to 𝐼(̈𝐴), with 𝑥, 𝑦 … indicating any 
arbitrarily selected element within each equivalence class so that, for instance, [𝑥] =
{𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 𝑎𝐼(̈𝐴)𝑥}. It is immediate to see that, if all elements of ?̈?(𝐴) are replaced with their 
respective equivalence class, the quasi-ordering is turned into a partially ordered set (poset). 
  
                                                     




Definition 4.3 (strong Pareto poset) 
The strong Pareto poset ?̇?(𝐴/𝐼)̈ is a reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric binary relation over the 
quotient set of 𝐼(̈𝐴) such that, for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐴 and all [𝑥], [𝑦] ∈ 𝐴/𝐼 ̈
 
 [𝑥]?̇?(𝐴/𝐼)̈[𝑦] ↔ 𝑥?̈?(𝐴)𝑦 (7) 
 
Given definitions 3.2 and 4.3 we can easily derive ℎ[𝑥], the average height of the equivalence class 
of any 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 in the strong Pareto poset and, from it, the following definition 
 
Definition 4.4 (Balanced conflict-mitigating Pareto-extension rule) 
A CCR is the Shepp-Winkler Pareto-extension rule if and only if, for all  (𝑆, 𝐴, 𝑅𝑠) ∈ 𝐷(𝑾
′) and 
for any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐴 
 
 𝑥𝑅𝑦 ↔ ℎ[𝑥] ≥ ℎ[𝑦] (8) 
 
Equivalently, and with the intent of making the structure of the rule more evident, let 𝑓, 𝑔, ℎ 
indicate, respectively, the strong Pareto rule, the binary relation in (7) and the average height 










From (9) it becomes clearer that 𝑠 maintains a strict relationship with the strong Pareto rule. In 
fact, while independence of irrelevant alternatives for 𝑠 is subject to the considerations in 
Pattanaik (2002 sec. 4.1) on that condition for positionalist rules and is only satisfied in the 
formulation therein proposed, the other conditions in the strong Pareto rule are clearly not 




4.3 Axiomatic characterization of the BCMR 
I am now organized to state and prove the following theorem 
 
Theorem 4.2: if a CCR 𝑠 is an ordered extension of the strong Pareto poset and satisfies balanced 
conflict mitigation, then 𝑠 is the balanced conflict-mitigating Pareto-extension rule. 
 
A CCR that is at the same time an extension of the strong Pareto poset and is conflict-mitigating 
is one such that, in (5), ?̇?(𝐴) is replaced with ?̇?(𝐴/𝐼)̈ and each alternative with its equivalence 
class. If it is balanced, then in (6) function 𝑔 must be the arithmetic mean. Specifically, if 𝑔 is 
continuous, decomposable, strictly monotone, and homogeneous, then 𝑔 must be a power mean 
of power 𝑝 in direct application of the Kolmogorov-Nagumo-De Finetti theorem (Beliakov et al. 
2007). If such power mean has the traslative property, then it is immediate to see that it must be 
of power 𝑝 = 1. As a consequence, we can rewrite (6) as the following relation: 
 
 𝑟 ([𝑥], ?̇?(𝐴/𝐼)̈) =






Substituting in (10) the definition of rank provided at the beginning of section 3 and making the 
opportune adjustments, it is easily seen that the condition above is equivalent to this: 
 
 #{[𝑗] ∈ 𝐴: [𝑥]?̇?(𝐴/𝐼)̈[𝑗]}  =






In turn, by adding 1 on both sides of (11), from definition 3.1 we get that the condition I derived 
from having a conflict-mitigating CCR based on the strong Pareto poset is equivalent to the 
definition of average height of an alternative in (2). Following from there, the definition of 






The set of all linear extensions of the strong Pareto poset is a remarkable object that deserves 
attention and a proper place in social choice theory. A class of specific but not so uncommon 
decision-making processes appears to work precisely on that set, which can still be built with a 
rather tentative knowledge of individual preferences in society. Each linear extension represents 
a collective choice that preserves observed unanimous preferences and is obtained without 
acknowledging special privileges to specific individuals or without restricting the domain of 
acceptable individual preference orderings. As soon as a non-negative “weight” is assigned to 
each individual preference ordering, expressing its frequency in the population or the intensity 
of the preference or any value judgement that is normatively accepted, one linear extension of the 
strong Pareto poset is unequivocally identifiable as the collective preference of the population of 
interest over that set of equivalence classes of alternatives. As long as that weight is not assigned 
and no assumptions are made about it, all the linear extensions can only represent possible 
outcomes of the decision-making process reflecting conflicting value systems and interests. If 
conflict is not going to be resolved by assigning a weight, then it can be mitigated by 
acknowledging that there is no ground to suggest that one linear extension is more likely than 
the others. Under these conditions, the expected position of each element in a randomly selected 
linear extension is a cautious, balanced outcome that mitigates the conflict between different 
value systems in a way that satisfies a list of desirable properties. While developed with different 
intents, the theory on correlation inequalities and Winkler’s average height functional relation 
provide a method to extend incomplete collective preferences in a way that is consistent with the 
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By diversion rate alone. The inconsistency and inequity of waste 





A substantial bulk of scientific literature deals with urban waste management systems (UWMS) 
and the evaluation of their performance (Allesch and Brunner 2014). The high-level parameter of 
evaluation is consistent across all the literature: it refers to the effectiveness in achieving 
environmental sustainability along the entire life cycle of the products becoming urban waste. 
The practical implementation of the evaluation, at least in a broad sense, is also not particularly 
controversial, and implies the identification of environmental performance indicators, which are 
generally considered as an important management tool providing decision makers with factual 
information on implemented strategies and credible forecasts on the consequences of future and 
even innovative policies (OECD 2013). Sets of indicators provide insight about if and which 
results are achieved in a specific territory after new strategies of waste collection are implemented 
and allow to compare contexts in which these processes are different. These sets of indicators are 
actually considered a standard and fundamental tool for policy evaluation, in particular to check 
if the targets of sustainability and communication towards citizenship have been reached (OECD 
2013; Vergara and Tchobanoglous 2012).  
A recent and extensive review of literature on performance indicators for UWMS can be found in 
a paper by Sanjeevi and Shahabudeen (2015), who also present a brief history of the development 
of performance indicators and discuss their organizational and management role. A more 
specialized part of the literature based on multi-criteria decision analysis is reviewed in Achillas 
et al. (2013)13. Basic indicators about waste collection and sorting generally include the amount of 
solid urban waste which is recycled, landfilled or reused (including composting), measured as an 
absolute value, as a percentage of total collection, or as a per capita amount and a classification 
of sorted and, sometimes, unsorted waste, according to their composition and their collection 
channel. Evaluations with a strong focus on basic performance indicators can be found in Wilson 
et al. (2012), where they are classified as indicators about public health and collection, 
environment and disposal, and resource recovery; in Desmond (2006); in Guimarães et al. (2010) 
                                                     




and in Mendes et al. (2012), who emphasize the relation between goals and indicators in the 
framework of a balanced scorecard approach; in Massoud et al. (2003) in which focus is on 
economic indicators. Approaches with a strong environmental, biological and chemical 
component (which are typically required to evaluate the entire integrated cycle of waste 
management) have their own literature like, for instance, the papers by Kaufman et al. (2010), 
Kulczycka et al. (2015),  and Zaccariello et al. (2015).  
This literature clarifies that, unfortunately, implementing the evaluation of a UWMS on more 
than a single indicator at a time can quickly become a complex issue, particularly if specific targets 
have to be met with respect to each indicator. What the different methods propose are, essentially, 
strategies to build aggregation functions that transform different sets of indicators into a synthetic 
measure that satisfies a certain number of goals and, as a consequence, the corresponding 
definition of sustainability in waste management. In doing so, each method has to make strong 
assumptions, the most frequent being connected either with the identification of a common unit 
of measurement (economic or otherwise) for the dimensions that have to be aggregated, or with 
the property of aggregation functions which implicitly justify at least some degree of 
compensation between the different dimensions being aggregated. In these frameworks, each 
indicator conveys its own distinctive part of information about the outcomes of waste 
management operations, in a set that is frequently characterized by elements of complementarity 
and elements of correlation that each method has to deal with using more or less sophisticated 
arrangements.  
Nonetheless, it is only recently that the criteria for selecting any indicator over others have come 
under scrutiny. In their paper (2014), Greene and Tonjes measured a battery of indicators of all 
degrees of complexity for ten municipalities in the state of New York, showing that ordering the 
municipalities according to the different indicators leads to very different rankings as a result of 
low or even negative correlation levels among the indicator values. They also stress that, all the 
noted methods notwithstanding, most UWMS are ultimately evaluated according to the recycling 
rate even though it may be insufficient, on its own, to assess sustainability of the waste 
management system.   
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The inconsistency of rankings based on similar but not identical indicators is a well-known issue 
in other fields where multi-indicator analyses are common, but in the specific field of UWMS 
evaluation this is quite a novelty and the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the problem 
(with a particular reference to the problems of identification, measurement and interpretability 
of the sustainability requirements) is generally strongly underestimated. 
In this work, the issue is studied in the context of the Italian multi-level waste taxation scheme, 
where the system assessment (and the parameters upon which it is conducted) has direct financial 
consequences on local governments and, in turn, on local taxation. The Italian national and 
regional legislation concerning UWMSs, in fact, is gradually designing a scheme of incentives 
and sanctions based on the performance of each UWMS at a municipal level, and the system is 
based on a single indicator, diversion percentage.  
In the first part of the work, the system is analysed using 2013 waste collection figures of almost 
seven thousand local governments assembled by the Italian National Institute for Environmental 
Protection and Research (ISPRA) and the 2014 data on the 32 municipalities in the Province of La 
Spezia (Liguria Region). We show that assumptions about the equivalence of diversion rate and 
degree of environmental sustainability of waste production and collection systems, which 
supposedly justify the use of a single indicator, are largely untenable. Applying analytical tools 
developed in the context of partial order theory (Schroder 2002) to municipalities in the study 
area, we show that a ranking of sustainability performances based on diversion rate is not robust 
to the introduction of additional indicators and that a multi-indicator evaluation based on four 
relevant metrics of sustainability assigns substantially different rankings.   
Afterwards, using the 2010-2014 data on waste collection in the Province of La Spezia, the second 
part of the paper makes use of a forecast of the 2019 tax burden generated by recently introduced 
waste taxation scheme. Presenting the forecast, it is shown that, choosing diversion rate as the 
single performance indicator, the scheme defines a tax function which is unrelated with 
environmental externalities and is inconsistent with the aims of the legislation. The current 
legislation is shown to be severely regressive in redistributing the burden between municipalities 
in the Province, thus potentially distorting fiscal competition and the residents’ perception about 




2. The study area, data and methods 
2.1 The Province of La Spezia and the UWMS legislation 
The main study area of this work, the Province of La Spezia, located in the easternmost part of 
Regione Liguria, is a Province of 32 municipalities with a population of about 220,000 and 160,889 
taxpayers in year 2014. Compared to other Provinces in Italy, it has a few remarkably average or 
next-to average characteristics like income (which is close to the average of Northern Italy), size 
of the largest urban area and a slightly above-average population density. According to the Italian 
Institute of Statistics, its municipalities represent a wide variety of geographical features 
(landlocked mountainous, landlocked hilly, coastal hills) and more than half of its municipalities 
are classified as mountain municipalities.  
Waste collection and disposal services are managed at a municipal level. In the years covered by 
this work, 24 out of 32 municipalities in the Province outsourced the service to a single company, 
Acam Ambiente S.p.A. on the basis of public service contracts, whereas the remaining 8 were 
managing the service in-house. Waste collection is mostly operated by waste collection vehicles 
on dumpsters, some of which are dedicated to sorted waste (paper, metal, plastic, glass and 
organic). Other types of waste (wood, fabric, waste of electric and electronic equipment and all 
sorts of bulky waste can be carried, at no charge, to a small number of collection centres or can be 
picked up by service operators at home for a fee. In just three municipalities across the province, 
curbside collection is active and covers the entire municipality, whereas in two more 
municipalities it is active in some areas. Service operators are responsible for managing the early 
stages of the recycling process for sorted waste. A negligible amount of unsorted waste produced 
in the province is treated in a single facility operated by Acam Ambiente S.p.A. to obtain refuse-
derived fuel. All remaining unsorted waste is transported to landfills, which may be located in 
the provincial or, in case of necessity, in the regional territory, but extra-regional transportation 
is also allowed when no landfill is active, at the condition of specific agreements between the 
involved regional governments, including on the compensation fee.        
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The Italian legislation on waste management is a combination of national measures, which deal 
with general principles, and regional measures, which regulate implementation details by 
Regional Law (see Table 1 for the current legislation in Regione Liguria).  
 
Table II-1. Minimal compendium of current National and Regional legislation on waste 
management evaluation in Regione Liguria Table II-0-1 
Law Level Effect 
Law 549/1995 National The “polluter pays” principle 
introduced in the national legislation; 
parliamentary mandate to government 
to introduce taxation on landfill disposal 
Legislative Decree 22/1997 National Introduction of the Special Tax on 
Landfill Disposal and definition of 
minimum rate 
Legislative Decree 
152/2006 (and its 
modifications) 
National Reclassification of the sources of 
Municipal Solid Waste; definition of 
minimum levels of diversion rate to be 
attained to avoid sanctions 
Law 147/2013 National Full cost coverage of waste management 
service through the new waste tax TARI 
Law 221/2015 National Sanctions for not reaching minimum 
levels of diversion rate now potentially 
referred to municipalities; gradual 
reductions on tax on landfill disposal if 
diversion targets are met 
Ministerial Decree May 
26th  2016 (Ministry of 
Environment) 
National Guidelines for calculating the diversion 
rate of municipal solid waste 
Regional Law 20/2015 
(Regione Liguria) 
Regional Introduction of a regional sanction 
scheme for municipalities not reaching a 
regional target of diversion rate 
Regional Law 16/2016 
(Regione Liguria) 
Regional Definition of current rate of Tax on 
Landfill Disposal for municipalities in 
Regione Liguria 
Sources: Own overview of National (Italian) and Regional legislation (Regione Liguria) 
 
The structure of incentives and sanctions changed several times and its commencement was 
repeatedly delayed since it was first introduced in the national legislation with Legislative Decree 
22/1997, with the latest changes occurring in the first months of 2016. The overall objective has 
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nonetheless remained the same: re-orienting UWMS in the perspective of a drastic reduction of 
landfill disposal and making municipalities responsible for it. Several policy tools are intended 
to attain this goal, among which diversion and recycling is by far the one which is given more 
emphasis but, according to multiple regional legislations, prevention of waste generation is 
expected to play an important role as well (Piano regionale di gestione dei rifiuti e delle bonifiche 2015). 
By design, the system is also clearly linked with the national regime of waste taxation introduced 
with Law 147/2013, which requires complete coverage of service costs at municipal level (see Art. 
1, Section 654) through the local waste tax “TARI”. 
At present, Municipalities are responsible for controlling service provision costs and are required 
to fully cover those costs through TARI. Subsequently, costs are adjusted as a consequence of 
performance evaluation on two possible grounds.  
First, a tax on landfill disposal is directly added to those costs by the national legislation, which 
also defines a minimum rate, a 20% surtax14 if the municipality does not comply with a minimum 
diversion rate of 65% and gradually reduced rates for municipalities beyond the 65% threshold. 
Regional governments can decree rates above the national minimum, so the current rate for 
Regione Liguria is at 15 € per Ton of waste sent to landfill.  
Second, regional governments are also allowed to add further targets and sanctions, which again 
are added to service provision costs. Municipalities in Regione Ligura that do not comply with a 
diversion threshold of 45% are therefore required to pay a further 25 € per Ton of unsorted urban 
waste exceeding the allowed percentage.  
Then, as the overall cost to be covered with TARI is determined, municipalities also have some 
degree of freedom in redistributing the overall tax burden among their residents. Law 147/2013 
indicates the general redistribution criteria, consisting of a specific tax base (real property), 
different determination methods of specific rates for households and other taxpayers, and some 
general criteria for adjustment coefficients (number of household members in the case of 
                                                     
14 The surtax mechanism was initially targeted at the “Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali” or ATO (Optimal territorial 
subdivisions), a service provision-related territorial subdivision that had to be gradually activated by groups of 
municipalities integrating their systems of service provision. The process was cancelled and law 221/2015 redirected 
the surtax mechanism to single municipalities wherever the ATO had not been activated. As a consequence, the 
surtax can work differently in different municipalities and conclusions in this work are designed to not depend on 
the effect of the surtax. 
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households and expected waste production potential of different activities in the case of the other 
taxpayers). Municipalities can then set the exact repartition between households and other 
taxpayers and the adjustment coefficients, provided that they conform to rational criteria and aim 
at proportionality between waste production and tax burden. Table 2 provides a synthesis of the 
current taxation in Regione Liguria affected by UWMS performance evaluation. 
 
Table II-2. Taxation affected by UWMS performance evaluation currently in force in Regione 
Liguria Table II-0-2 
Tax Tax base  Current rate Effect on 
taxpayer 
TARI Real property Variable, up to full coverage of 
service provision at municipal 
level 
Direct 
Tax on Landfill 
Disposal 
Waste sent to 
landfill 
15 € per Ton, 18 € per Ton if 
below 65% of diversion rate, tax 
reduced by 30% to 70% if 





excess of 55% 
sent to 
landifill  
25 € per Ton Through TARI 
Sources: Own compendium of National and Regional legislation 
 
2.2 Data: 2010-2014  
The main source of data is the Italian National Institute for Environmental Protection and 
Research (ISPRA)15, a public body that operates under the vigilance and policy guidance of the 
Italian Ministry for the Environment and the Protection of Land and Sea. Among its duties, ISPRA 
creates and manages databases on environmental issues, including the main national database 
on urban solid waste, the Catasto dei rifiuti (urban waste cadastre) which is populated with data 
provided by the regional divisions of the institute and by municipalities through a specific form 
for environmental declaration  
The reported indicators are detailed in Table 3. 
                                                     
15 See http://www.isprambiente.gov.it  
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At the time of writing this paper, the database reports data for the years 2010-2014. Data for year 
2013 has a good nationwide coverage, as detailed waste management indicators for 2013 cover 
4158 municipalities and the main indicators (first 5 rows of Table 3) cover 8046 municipalities. 
According to ISPRA, missing 2013 data from municipalities that did not provide full information 
can be estimated to amount to 0.3% of urban waste production and 0.1% of sorted waste (ISPRA 
2014). Data for 2014 was fully available for the Province of La Spezia.  
 
Table II-3. Italian National Institute for Environmental Protection 
and Research, waste indicators for Italian municipalities Table I0-3 
Indicator Notes 
Urban waste (total) Tonnes 
Sorted waste (total) Tonnes 
Percentage of sorted waste  Percent of total urban 
waste 
Urban waste per capita (Kg./Resid. Year) 
Sorted waste per capita (Kg./Resid. Year) 
Mixed bulky waste Tonnes 






Electrical and electronic waste 
(WEEE) 
Tonnes 
Hazardous and biomedical Tonnes 
Biodegradable waste Tonnes 
Other sorted waste Tonnes 
Source: ISPRA (www.isprambiente.gov.it) 
 
In order to ensure homogeneous data, since 1997 (legislative decree 22/1997) the Italian national 
legislation prepared the ground for introducing a uniform methodology to calculate diversion 
rate and other statistics on diversion through a future governmental decree. However, the decree 
was only issued in 2016 (ministerial decree 78/2016) and, as a consequence, at the time of writing 
this paper no available data was necessarily consistent with the methodology defined in it. 
Between 1997 and 2016, all regional governments across Italy had to issue provisional norms 
providing for regionally homogeneous methods to calculate indicators on waste management, 
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which were then materially applied by local government authorities and companies supplying 
waste collection and disposal services. Notably, in the study area of this paper, 24 out of 32 
municipalities have the same service provider (ACAM Ambiente S.p.A), a degree of 
concentration that is similar to that found across Italy. On these grounds (same rules and same 
data collectors), we expect intra-provincial comparisons of municipal data to be sufficiently 
reliable. Furthermore, among its institutional duties, ISPRA is also responsible for cross-checking 
data from different sources, like for instance municipalities, collection service providers and 
disposal/landfill service providers and for conducting punctual inspections in case of 
discrepancies. 
Data on resident population at a municipal level for years 2010-2014 was retrieved from the 
website of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)16. Additional data on income and income 
classes in fiscal year 2013 at a municipal level was retrieved from the data archive of the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance17. Finally, data on waste tax revenue in fiscal year 2013 was retrieved 
from municipal budget reports of each municipality in the Province of La Spezia.  
The 2013 nationwide data from ISPRA provides good initial evidence on the issue at stake. A first 
remark should be that, even though lagging, Italian authorities have at their disposal a multi-
indicator system about environmental performances of UWMS meaning that, either directly or 
through some basic transformation, several of the available indicators do measure different 
relevant dimensions of environmental performance. While there are obvious overlaps between 
some indicators, particularly when they detail a specific kind of waste, many still provide relevant 
information as they hint at the level of sophistication of the sorted waste collection chain, at 
different environmental awareness levels and, most importantly, at very different kinds of 
environmental harm.  
Given the relative wealth of information available, it seems inevitable to investigate the possible 
drawbacks of an evaluation system based on diversion percentage alone. In choosing it as the 
discriminant to define sanctions and incentives, the legislator assumed that diversion percentage 
                                                     





would be a very good proxy for the overall level of environmental sustainability attained by a 
municipal UWMS. According to this implicit assumption, a high diversion percentage should 
accurately predict most (if not all) of the different dimensions of environmental sustainability in 
waste production and collection, including those concerning waste production per capita.  
Contrary to expectations, though, the overall correlation between these two measures at a 
national level is negligible (R=0.11 in the last year available). Municipalities that in 2013 were 
already compliant with the 65% diversion rate goal, were no more accomplished than all others 
in containing the amount of waste produced per capita. Furthermore, correlation between 
diversion rate and unsorted waste (destined to landfill) per capita is evident but far from perfect 
(R=-0.73), with plenty of cases where a low diversion percentage is combined with very small 
amounts of waste sent to landfill. Based on the relations above, the assumed comprehensiveness 
of diversion percentage as an indicator cannot be confirmed. In order to make an idea of the 
magnitude of the issue, it can be helpful to consider that, in 2013, more than 2 million Italians 
lived in municipalities that, in spite of diverting less than 50% of their waste, were already 
producing and sending to landfill less than 159 Kg/year per capita, an amount corresponding to 
a very ambitious target set by Piedmont Region for 2020 and well below the target set for the 
same year by Liguria Region (about 182 Kg/year per capita). 
In the study area, the magnitude of this effect is even larger: the two correlation coefficients in 
2014, shown in Table 4, were R=0.04 between diversion percentage and urban waste per capita 
and R=-0.49 between diversion percentage and unsorted waste per capita. 
 
Table II-4. Correlation coefficients of Diversion % Table II-0-4 
Performance indicator Diversion % 
Waste per capita +0.04 
Unsorted per capita -0.49* 
Sorted per capita +0.82* 
Sorted paper per capita +0.67* 
Sorted plastic per capita +0.44* 
Sorted glass per capita +0.31 
Sorted organic per capita +0.85* 
Sorted WEEE per capita +0.53* 
Notes: * p<0.05 




Diversion percentage is a really strong correlate (at least R=±0.7) of only two of all collection 
statistics available (Table 4), diversion per capita and organic waste per capita. Furthermore, 
given the unimpressive correlations among collection indicators, it is very unlikely that 
environmental sustainability dimensions concerning anything else than waste collection would 
be well represented by diversion percentage, even though there is no available data to verify that.  
This preliminary data overview suggests that diversion percentage is not an adequate proxy for 
most of the other indicators. It is also specifically weak in representing some dimensions, like 
waste production per capita, that are certainly relevant to the aims of the waste disposal 
legislation. 
In the remainder of this work, in order to compare evaluations based on diversion percentage 
with more multidimensional evaluations, three indicators taken from Table 4 will be used 
extensively: unsorted waste per capita, sorted organic waste per capita and sorted waste of 
electric and electronic equipment (WEEE) per capita. Unsorted waste per capita is a particularly 
relevant indicator as one of the goals of waste legislation is to reduce the amount of waste sent to 
landfill and, in the absence of functioning materials recovery facilities, unsorted waste and waste 
sent to landfill are very similar amounts. Organic waste per capita is relevant for three different 
reasons: in terms of weight, it is the single most important category of sorted waste were organic 
waste collection is working; it is also a potentially critical kind of waste in terms of environmental 
hazard; furthermore, the management strategy is typically distinct from that of all other sorted 
materials. Finally, WEEE sorting is relevant both because of the environmental hazard and 
because sorting is only sparingly active across the Province of La Spezia and can possibly be 
considered as an indicator of above-average effort. 
 
2.3 Data projections to 2019 
Unfortunately, the 2010-2014 data, by itself, is not sufficient to answer our research questions. 
The latest changes in the scheme of incentives and sanctions will come into force in 2016 and will 
affect taxpayers in 2017 based on the 2016 diversion rates. With respect to that, earlier data have 
two significant limitations. First, performance evaluations from 2016 onwards will arguably 
reflect not only the 2014 indicator level but also its recent trend, meaning that municipalities with 
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low diversion rates might be catching up quickly, even more so because of the looming 
enforcement of the new regional sanction from 2016. Second, any evaluation on fairness depends 
on which municipalities in the study area qualify for incentives or sanctions; any consideration 
based on 2014 could be misleading as very few municipalities, by then, reached the 65%  (or even 
just the 45%) threshold while, on the other hand, some were sufficiently near to close the gap in 
a few years.  
In order to make considerations based on a context in which the new legislation regime is fully 
operational, year 2019 seems an ideal choice. At that point, the latest changes in legislation will 
have been active for four years, allowing municipalities that are substantially increasing their 
diversion rate, to reach the target. It will also be the last year of the 45% regional threshold, as it 
will increase to 65% in 2020. As a consequence, making estimates for the years following 2020, 
would imply assumptions on how municipalities are going to adjust to the impending 65% target, 
which is currently out of reach for almost all municipalities in the study area at the current rate 
of improvement.    
Based on such considerations, in this paper 2010-2014 data are used to produce a straightforward 
2019 forecast by OLS estimation for all relevant waste collection indicators, together with the 
estimates for 2019 population18 (in order to calculate per capita indicators) provided by the Italian 
institute of official statistics (ISTAT) and the taxation burden produced by the new scheme. 
A detailed discussion on what can be inferred from 2019 forecasts using various analytical tools 
is in the following sections. Even without introducing specific tools, though, forecasts provide 
further compelling evidence about the questionable logic of the scheme. In Figure 1 the black line 
represents the cost of an additional ton of waste sent to Landfill in the study area (the main 
vertical axis on the left) as a function of diversion rate. The dashed line represents the same cost 
in municipalities where the 20% surtax is applied (see note 1, pg. 3 and Table 2). The joint effect 
of the regional sanction and the tax on landfill disposal makes the cost a decreasing function of 
the diversion rate until 45% diversion is reached. Then the cost is constant until the 65% of 
diversion is achieved, after which it starts decreasing again, in steps. The data points around the 
                                                     
18 See http://demo.istat.it  
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line are the municipalities in the study area, positioned according to their diversion rate and their 
amount of landfill disposal per capita (the secondary vertical axis on the right). Municipalities on 
the left have to pay for every additional ton of waste sent to landfill with a relatively high increase 
in unit cost19 under the rationale that their waste management system, having a low diversion 
percentage, is not working well. Nonetheless, the sanction decreases steeply and, at 45% of 




FIGURE 1  Province of La Spezia, cost of landfill disposal, diversion rate and landfill per capita 
Notes: The dark line represents the cost faced by municipalities in the study area to send an additional ton of waste to 
landfill (left vertical axis), as a function of their diversion rate. The dotted line integrates the cost with the national 
surtax for municipalities not belonging to ATOs and below 65% of diversion rate (see footnote 2). Each circle represents 
a municipality in the study area, plotted according to the amount of waste sent to landfill per capita (right vertical axis) 
and its diversion rate. Notice the cluster of municipalities (bottom left) with average‐to‐low landfill use per capita and 
yet facing costs that are very close to the maximum. 
 
Two inconsistencies appear evident from the figure. Municipalities with an average or high 
diversion rate can increase landfill use per capita indefinitely at a very bland rate of 4.5-15 €/ton, 
provided that their diversion rate is not affected. Municipalities on the flat section of the cost 
                                                     
19 Notably, the highest potential cost corresponding to a municipality with no diversion, is 29 €/ton. It is a diminutive 
sanction compared to that imposed by the corresponding tax in the United Kingdom and the rate of which is 82.60 




curve can increase landfill use even at the expense of their diversion rate, provided that they 
remain above the 45% threshold. The second and most relevant point is that even in this relatively 
small dataset we have a practical example of a municipality sending less than 350 Kg/year per 
capita to landfill, but paying a cost that is almost 60% higher than another municipality with a 
landfill usage of almost 380 Kg/year per capita. More generally, the cost of landfill disposal as 
function of diversion rate is broadly proportional to the effect that diversion percentage has on 
the use of landfill per capita in about half the municipalities in the study area. The cluster of points 
in the lower left part of the figure indicates municipalities for which the cost is, instead, 




FIGURE 2  Disposal, diversion rate and landfill per capita 
Notes: The dark line represents the cost faced by municipalities in Lombardy to send an additional ton of waste to 
landfill (left vertical axis), as a function of their diversion rate. The dotted line integrates the cost with the national 
surtax for municipalities not belonging to ATOs and below 65% of diversion rate (see footnote 2). Each circle represents 
a municipality in Lombardy, plotted according to the amount of waste sent to landfill per capita (right vertical axis) 
and its diversion rate. Darker dots are meant to highlight municipalities with a very moderate use of landfill. As in the 
study area, they are subject to all sorts of unit cost, from very low to the highest possible. 
 
In Figure 2, the same situation is verified with respect to the municipalities of Lombardy and 
observed 2013 data. Without additional regional sanctions, the cost curve as a function of the 
diversion rate is flat until the 65% threshold. Even so, its shape seems to have little relation with 
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the effect that diversion has on landfill use and, as a consequence, different costs hit 
municipalities sending about the same amount of waste to landfill per capita in an apparently 
random fashion. The darker dots in Figure 2 identify municipalities sending an amount between 
100 Kg/year and 200 Kg/year per capita to landfill. For some of those municipalities, the cost of 
an additional ton of waste sent to landfill is 17 €, while others pay as little as 9.5 €.  In sum we 
found no relation, either in the study area or in a much larger and representative dataset, that the 
tax function is proportional to landfill use and, consequently, related to the social cost associated 
with landfill disposal, with the local governments paying wildly different fees to cover the same 




In the remainder of the paper, we discuss two distinct issues that require application of as many 
different methods. First, we aim at comparing the sustainability ranking of UWMS in the study 
area and determined by diversion rate, with the ranking produced by a multi-indicator system. 
The latter can be obtained following different approaches, among which one can be found in 
partial order theory, after noting that a set of UWMS, each identified by a vector of observed 
indicators, is in fact a partially ordered set. We interpret partial order theory as the ideal 
framework to build a multi-indicator evaluation both because of its solid mathematical 
background (Schroder 2002) and its existing applications in multi-indicator evaluations 
(Brüggemann and Patil 2011) but also because it is less information demanding and less reliant 
on strong assumptions than other available methods (see section 3). Specifically, we borrow three 
different tools from partial order theory. Hasse diagrams (Schroder 2002 p. 6) provide visual 
representations of partially ordered sets and are particularly useful for data exploration and for 
visual comparison. The ξ matrix is a representation in matricial form of dominance in a partially 
ordered set (Brüggemann and Patil 2011 p. 22) and it is also a very practical tool to count the 
number of ordered pairs of element in a partially ordered set. This makes it useful to track the 
changes in such number between a diversion rate-based ranking and a multi-indicator ranking. 
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Finally, average height in partially ordered sets (Winkler 1982) is a tool that reduces a partially 
ordered set into a linear order and thus allows a complete ranking. 
In the subsequent part of the paper, we discuss the effects of a single-indicator system on fairness 
in waste taxation. We make use of the well-known Suits index (Suits 1977) which is designed to 
represent tax progressivity using the same mathematical tools of Gini’s index. 
 
3. Comparing single and multi-indicator evaluations of sustainability 
performance 
3.1 From a multi-indicator system to a metric for performance evaluation 
In order to study the possible drawbacks of an evaluation based on a single indicator, it can be 
helpful to compare its results with those that stem from a proper multi-indicator system. If the 
evaluation based on diversion percentage is an objective assessment of environmental 
performance, considering other critical indicators should not alter the results dramatically. 
Otherwise, good and bad performances would only reflect our single-indicator arbitrary choice 
rather than some general concept of environmental sustainability.   
An ideal multi-indicator system in the context of waste management would provide information 
on more than just waste collection. It would arguably cover the activities of transport, treatment, 
disposal, the efficiency of the whole industrial process and more. As we mentioned before, 
though, available data only covers some indicators about waste collection. Even so, when the 
multi-indicator system consisting of currently available data will be made comparable to the 
indicator about diversion percentage, the differences will prove to be remarkable.    
Multi-indicator systems can be used to support performance evaluations in a multiplicity of ways. 
In a dashboard environment, the levels of all indicators concerned are separately represented to 
provide an overview of the situation. However, benchmarks and thresholds are considered 
indicator by indicator and the dashboard by itself cannot provide a metric of overall performance.  
More compact metrics of performance are usually obtained through a dimensional reduction of 
the multi-indicator system, which is generally performed as a linear combination (and 
occasionally a geometric combination) of the original indicators. In spite of being so common, 
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though, this approach is not always feasible or appropriate for the context. Linear and geometric 
combinations of indicators allow, respectively, full and non-constant compensation between 
indicators, meaning that a poor performance in one dimension can be offset by a positive 
performance in another one (OECD 2008). This implies the existence of a system of weights that 
make the different indicators comparable, and the acceptability of a rate of substitution between 
them, but both assumptions may easily be questionable whenever a monetization of the 
indicators is not immediately possible.  
Alternatively, dimensional reduction can be performed without linear or geometric combinations 
of indicators and without compensability among indicators, thanks to methods developed in the 
field of discrete mathematics and in order theory. Such methods have easily found applications 
in chemistry and environmental research (Brüggemann et al. 2004; Brüggemann and Patil 2011; 
De Loof et al. 2011; Voigt et al. 2004), where e.g. a ranking of areas according to their pollution 
level makes little sense if considering more than one pollutant implies accepting the notion of a 
rate of substitution between different chemicals. 
The main contributions of this field of research consist in the interpretation of multi-indicator 
systems as partially ordered sets, the development of improved methods to visually study 
partially ordered sets through Hasse diagrams and, finally, applying the measure of average 
height in a partially ordered set (Winkler 1982) and developing some approximations of it.  
 
3.2 Partially ordered sets, Hasse diagrams, Local Partial Order Models and their application to 
UWMS evaluation 
In Order Theory, two elements ℎ, 𝑘 in a set 𝑆 are comparable if it is possible to establish a hierarchy 
between them (Schroder 2002), i.e. if it is possible to state that: 
 
 ℎ ≥ 𝑘        𝑉        ℎ < 𝑘 (1) 
 
The set  S is linearly (or totally) ordered if all of its n elements are comparable. In a more general 
case, S is a partially ordered set (POSET) if at least two of its elements are comparable. 
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A typical example of a POSET is a data matrix 𝑃𝑛 x 𝑚 containing 𝑛 elements described by 𝑚 







and, given the definitions of comparability and POSET, 𝑃 must contain at 




 ∀ 1 ≤ t ≤ m. 
A group of UWMSs can be described by a POSET in which the profile of each system consists of 
the row vector of its performance indicators. The results will possibly indicate that some systems 
are performing better than some others but not every possible couple of systems will necessarily 
end up being comparable. In some cases, it might not be possible to decide which in the couple is 
performing better.  
This analysis can be very practically represented through a Hasse diagram (Schroder 2002 p. 7). 
A Hasse diagram represents each profile of the POSET as a node of a directed graph where all 
edges are directed upwards, and the direction can therefore be omitted. The structure of the graph 
depends on the notion of covering relation. A profile 𝑎(ℎ) > 𝑎(𝑘) is said to cover 𝑎(𝑘) if there exists 
no third profile 𝑎(𝑧) in the POSET for which 𝑎(𝑘) < 𝑎(𝑧) < 𝑎(ℎ). The graph of the Hasse diagram is 
then built according to the following rules: 
 
1. If 𝑎(𝑘) < 𝑎(ℎ), then 𝑎(𝑘)is below 𝑎(ℎ)in the drawing; 
2. If 𝑎(ℎ) covers 𝑎(𝑘), an edge is included between the two. 
 
Generally, profiles are arranged vertically in levels that depend on the structure of the graph and, 
when a profile could be located in several levels, the highest possible is selected. Figure 3 presents 
an example of Hasse diagram with just six profiles: 𝑎(𝑔) covers 𝑎(𝑘), 𝑎(ℎ),  𝑎(𝑙)  and 𝑎(𝑟), all of 






FIGURE 3  Hasse diagram of a POSET of six profiles 
 
The pairwise ordering of profiles that produces the Hasse diagram can also be represented in 
matricial form, a strategy that can be very convenient to compare different partial orders. Given 
a POSET of 𝑛 profiles 𝑎(1), 𝑎(2), … , 𝑎(𝑛), we can represent it as a square matrix ξ = (ξ𝑖𝑗) with 𝑖 =
1, 2, … , 𝑛 and 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 where ξ𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝑎
(𝑖) > 𝑎(𝑗) and ξ𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. The ξ matrix of the 
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In this work, the ξ matrix is used as a diagnostic tool to measure the loss of comparability in a 
POSET when the original set of attributes determining the order is expanded, so that if POSET 𝑃1 
is ordered according to 𝑚 attributes, POSET 𝑃2 is ordered according to 𝑚 + 1 attributes and so 










Therefore, the loss of comparability between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 can be defined as: 
 
 





In the context of a performance evaluation process, there are two advantages in representing the 
group of UWMSs to be evaluated, as a POSET. The first is to identify performance rankings that 
do not depend on just one in a set of multiple relevant and non-perfectly correlated indicators. 
Such rankings can be represented with Hasse diagrams and provide valuable and 
multidimensional information even though they probably contain some incomparability and the 
ranking can therefore be incomplete.  
The second advantage is that a partial order can be reduced to a linear order, without resorting 
to any linear or geometric combination of the indicators, by the way of  Local Partial Order 
Models (LPOMs) (Brüggemann and Patil 2011). Given a POSET P, (see Figure 3), the linear 
extensions of P (Schroder 2002 pp. 161–163) are all the linear orders compatible with P, meaning 
that they preserve all order relations found in the POSET. In the case of P, the POSET contains nine 
order relations between profiles: 𝑎(𝑔) > 𝑎(𝑠),  𝑎(𝑘), 𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) and 𝑎(𝑠) < 𝑎(𝑘),  𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟). A 
linear extension L of P  is, therefore, identified by any ordering of all incomparable profiles 𝑎(𝑘),  
𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) provided that the order relations with 𝑎(𝑔) and 𝑎(𝑠) are preserved (see Figure 3). The 
linear extensions of a POSET can be used to extract valuable information about its structure. 
Formally, the position of a profile 𝑎(𝑘) in the v-th linear extension, counting from the bottom, is 
called height 𝐻(𝑎(𝑘), 𝐿𝑣) of 𝑎














where 𝐿𝑇 is the number of all linear extensions in the POSET (Brüggemann and Patil 2011).  
If ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘)) is known, it amounts to a linear order that is compatible with the partial order of the 
POSET. However, the number of all linear extensions in a POSET is 1 ≤ LT ≤ n!  (Brüggemann 
and Carlsen 2011) and determining all of them quickly becomes computationally impossible as 𝑛 
grows (Brüggemann et al. 2004).  
Several methods to approximate ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘)) have been proposed20 among which LPOMs, that are 
being progressively developed to allow approximations with the least possible distortion. We 
will make use of the first LPOM to be developed, called LPOM0 (Brüggemann et al. 2004), which 
was empirically shown (Brüggemann and Annoni 2014) to be not necessarily a worse 
approximation than the others. Looking at the POSET in Figure 3 as an example, the average 
height of, say, profile 𝑎(𝑘), depends mostly on profiles that are certainly ordered above it (𝑎(𝑔)) 
and on profiles certainly ordered below it (𝑎(𝑠)). The exact order of profiles above and below is 
irrelevant, as any linear extension of the subsets above and below 𝑎(𝑘) will produce the same 
outcome. Consequently, the average height of 𝑎(𝑘)depends on the method selected to merge 
incomparable profiles 𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) with the others. The approximation performed by LPOM0 
consists in considering all the incomparable profiles as a single object that can be assigned to any 
position above or below 𝑎(𝑘).  
Let (𝑎(𝑘)) and 𝐹(𝑎(𝑘)), or 𝑂 and 𝐹 for brevity, be the principal downset and upset of 𝑎(𝑘), i.e., 
respectively, the subset of the POSET P containing 𝑎(𝑘) and all 𝑎(ℎ) ≤ 𝑎(𝑘) or all 𝑎(ℎ) ≥ 𝑎(𝑘). 
Furthermore, let 𝑈(𝑎(𝑘)), or 𝑈, be the subset of P containing all elements incomparable to 𝑎(𝑘). 
Finally, let ‖𝑃‖ denote the number of profiles contained in the POSET P.  LPOM0 approximates 
the height of each profile to a weighted average of its height when the block of incomparable 
profiles are merged above it, and a weighted average of its height when the block of incomparable 
profiles is merged below it.  
                                                     





ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘))  ≅  
‖𝑂‖
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In (6), the first product represents the height of  𝑎(𝑘) if U is merged below it (the sum of profiles 
in O and U) and is weighted by the probability of such arrangement, that is, the share of all spots 
available for U that are actually below 𝑎(𝑘). Similarly, the second product represents the height 
of 𝑎(𝑘) if U is merged above it (just the number of profiles in O) weighted by the share of spots 
available above 𝑎(𝑘). For a discussion on the possible distortions of this approximation see 
Brüggemann and Carlsen (2011).  
The quantity in (1) is, therefore, our partial order-derived synthetic indicator of UWMS 
performance. LPOM0 of user defined datasets can be performed online on www.PyHasse.org.  
 
3.3 Results 
The results for 2019 data projections are shown in Figure 421. On the left, from top to bottom, are 
represented Hasse diagrams built on four performance indicators (Figure 4a.: diversion 
percentage, unsorted waste per capita, organic waste per capita and WEEE per capita), on three 
indicators (Figure 4b.: without organic waste) and on two indicators (Figure 4c.: with just 
diversion percentage and unsorted waste per capita). On the right is the Hasse diagram based on 
diversion percentage alone (Figure 4d.), which corresponds to a total order. As by default in 
Hasse diagrams, all indicators are consistently directed so that high values (in this case, good 
performances) are at the top of the diagram and bad performances are at the bottom, while 
performances on the same level are incomparable. The number of levels is a broad indicator of 
the amount of comparability and, by representing the same group of UWMS according to an 
increasing set of indicators, we also make sure that, moving clockwise from Figure 4d. to Figure 
4a., the order relations that depended on diversion percentage but are inconsistent with the other 
indicators are progressively dropped.   
                                                     




Moving from a single indicator to four, some rankings are relatively stable. Three of the top five 
municipalities remain at the top level and three of the bottom five municipalities remain 
somewhere close to the bottom. However, the overall effect is a marked decrease of 
comparability. In Figure 5, the progressive loss of comparability is tracked in correspondence 
with the introduction of each additional indicator. In the case of total order, the number of 
comparable pairs that can be identified in our set is 496, while the number falls to 187 when four 
indicators are used, corresponding to less than 38% of the original level of comparability.  
What looked like a straightforward ranking in a one-dimensional world is in fact a problematic 
partial order because the four performance indicators are not consistent with each other. As a 
consequence, whatever “compliance line” is drawn to discriminate UWMS that conform to 
multidimensional parameters of environmental sustainability from those that are not performing 
well enough, the results would be substantially different from those due to the 50% of diversion 
rate threshold. 
Based on the amount of comparability left after increasing the number of indicators to four, we 
get only about six levels of performance. Each level except the lowest has a robust degree of 
internal incomparability meaning that, for example, municipalities performing well in a four-
dimensional frame of reference are doing well for different reasons. Even though Hasse diagrams 
and other partial order tools can only illustrate incomparabilities and not provide causal 
explanations, incomparability of municipal services (and particularly between the best 
performing municipalities) may hint to the fact that each indicator is a challenge of different 
severity depending on the characteristics of a municipality. In turn, this means that choosing one 
indicator over the others as the key parameter implies the arbitrary allocation of an advantage for 






FIGURE 4  Province of La Spezia. Partial orders of UWMS performances: (a) ranked according to diversion rate, 
landfill per capita, organic per capita and WEEE per capita; (b) ranked according to diversion rate, landfill per capita 
and organic per capita; (c) ranked according to diversion rate and landfill per capita; (d) ranked according to 






FIGURE 5  Loss of order relations following an increase in dimensionality. When linearly ordered according to 
diversion rate, the UWMS in the study area form 496 comparable pairs. Progressively introducing landfill per capita, 
organic per capita and WEEE per capita in the ranking procedure, the resulting partial orders have a number of 
comparable pairs that is reduced to 187 
 
In Table 5, UWMS performances are ranked according to diversion percentage and compared 
with a ranking based on a local partial order model with four attributes (LPOM 4 ranking), which 
is a linear extension of the partial order represented in Figure 4a. As the Hasse diagrams were 
suggesting, a linear order based on four indicators is very different from that produced by 
diversion percentage and, as anticipated above, the two rankings make it clear that there is no 
meaningful threshold that can be placed to discriminate good and bad performances in both 
rankings without conspicuous differences in the composition of the good group and the bad 
group.   
All this considered, the assumption that diversion percentage is an adequate proxy for all 
available information on environmental sustainability achieved by UWMS seems ungrounded 





Table II-5. UWMS ranking by diversion percentage and by local partial order model with 4 
attributesTable II-0-5 
Municipality Rank  
(Div %) 
Rank  
(LPOM 4 ) 
Municipality Rank 
 (Div %) 
Rank  
(LPOM 4 ) 
Ame 3 11 Lev 1 2 
Arc 6 7 Mai 13 28 
Bev 12 4 Mon 20 24 
Bol 25 17 Ort 24 28 
Bon 28 32 Pig 23 30 
Bor 22 26 Por 2 6 
Bru 10 10 Ric 17 14 
Cal 16 18 Rio 7 8 
Car 29 26 Roc 5 3 
Cad 27 16 San 21 12 
Cas 19 13 Sar 18 9 
Dei 14 20 Ses 26 25 
Fol 32 21 Var 15 14 
Fra 4 1 Ver 11 19 
Las  8 5 Vez 31 31 
Ler 30 21 Zig 9 21 
Source: Own calculation based on data from ISPRA 
 
4 Fairness of the single-indicator evaluation 
4.1 Fairness of the 2019 estimated tax burden 
Diversion percentage as a stand-alone performance indicator for UWMS is an arbitrary choice 
with vast consequences on the results of the evaluation. But are these consequences randomly 
spread across the population?  And more specifically, can we expect no consequences on the 
fairness of the waste taxation system when environmental performance is arbitrarily represented 
with diversion percentage and when fiscal sanctions and incentives are determined according to 
it?  
In our study area and more generally in Italy, incentives and sanctions based on diversion 
percentage directly affect the distribution of the tax burden among the municipalities rather than 
among the individuals. In fact, the current legislation imposes full cost coverage of waste 
management services at municipal level through TARI, and such costs are reduced by incentives 
and increased by sanctions. As a consequence, taxpayers in a municipality affected by sanctions 
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will collectively suffer a higher tax burden and taxpayers in a municipality enjoying the 
incentives will get a decreased burden. Then, at the level of each municipality, further national 
and local norms regulate the redistribution of the tax burden between residents according to 
loosely redistributive principles. However, as income groups are not proportionally distributed 
across all municipalities, it is rather evident that intra-municipal redistribution will not be enough 
to compensate inter-municipal distortions, if there are any. 
This seems remarkable, as waste taxation is one of the (few) backbones of fiscal autonomy in Italy. 
Sizeable differences in the local taxation burden can affect fiscal competition and citizens’ 
perception about the performance of local governments. As long as the diversion rate of specific 
waste categories depends on socio-economic factors, territorial fairness is also affected and 
potential effects could be more severe precisely where territorial inequality is greater already. All 
these consequences could arguably be accepted if they were justified by relevant and consistent 
policy objectives, much less so if the policy goal (protecting the environment) is not consistent 
with the parameter that is ultimately responsible for creating such consequences. 
Based on these considerations, we argue that the size and nature of inter-municipal distortions 
should be explicitly determined. 
 
4.2 SUITS index and its application to evaluate the fairness of waste taxation in the study area 
Different methods are available to evaluate the progressiveness of a tax. Distributional tables offer 
a general understanding of how the tax impacts different income classes, while synthetic indices 
provide a sharper summary statistic to allow comparison of different situations or alternatives 
(Slemrod 1996). Among the latter, the Suits index (Suits 1977) is a standard of tax policy analysis. 
The index is a close relative of the Lorenz Curve and the Gini concentration ratio: it compares 















where 𝐾, 𝐿 can be represented as areas, like in Figure 6, delimited by the diagonal and by the tax 










where 𝑇 is the tax burden and 𝑦 is income. In the case of a progressive tax, as in Figure 6, 𝐿 is 
smaller than 𝐾, and the index value is then 0 < 𝑆 ≤ 1, corresponding to the white area 
represented in the figure. In the case of a perfectly proportional tax, the tax burden function 
coincides with the diagonal starting in (0, 0), so that 𝐿 = 𝐾 = 0.5 and the index 𝑆 = 0. In the case 




FIGURE 6  Graphical representation of the Suits index of a progressive tax 
Notes: The white area is identified as the difference between the areas K and L. The Suits index can then be obtained 
dividing it by the area K. As long as K ‐ L is a positive quantity (i.e. as long as the curve delimiting L is convex) the 
Suits index is positive as well and the tax under consideration is progressive. 
 
The index is particularly effective in comparing how different tax schemes distribute the burden 
in relation with income. In the case presented here, one side of the comparisons can include the 
special tax on landfill disposal and the regional sanction, but also the combination of the two, to 
represent the performance-related taxation scheme. The other side can be represented with the 
observed tax burden at the latest date available (which is year 2014). We will also make a case for 
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including, as a term of comparison, an entirely hypothetical poll tax by which every taxpayer in 
the study area would pay the same share of the 2019 tax burden determined by the tax on landfill 











where 𝑇𝑖 is the tax burden generated by municipality 𝑖 and 𝑛 is the number of taxpayers across 
the entire province.  Available data would not allow a straightforward application of the index, 
a relatively common situation with the Suits index. The index is intended to cumulate individual 
incomes and individual tax burdens, whereas available information is frequently more 
aggregated than that. In order to get values for accumulated percent of the tax burden, we forecast 
the 2019 burden generated by the upcoming scheme for each municipality. Furthermore, it was 
possible to obtain figures for the 2014 burden generated in each municipality by the current waste 
taxation from the municipalities’ budgets. We have no data on the intra-municipal burden 
distribution, which is subject to national legislation, local regulations and, most importantly, to 
the distribution, at individual level, of land and real estate ownership. However, this is a 
relatively unimportant limitation, as the scheme we analyse only discriminates between 
municipalities and not between individuals. Given that intra-municipal burden distribution is 
generally informed by some degree of progressivity, we just expect the actual individual tax 
burden to be somewhat less regressive than the inter-municipal distribution, proportionally, for 
all taxes. A more significant issue is that the income level of each taxpayer is also not available. 
Nonetheless, data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance provide the average income of 
residents at municipal level. Along with it, more detailed information quantify, again at 
municipal level, the number of taxpayers falling into eight different income classes and the overall 
income of that class. From this, it is obviously possible to build a municipal average income for 
each income class and assign each taxpayer with the average income of his/her income class.  
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As a consequence of these adjustments, each of our data points consists of one taxpayer with a 
tax burden equal to the average municipal tax burden and an income that is either equal to the 
average municipal income or to the average municipal income of the income class they belong to.  
 
4.3 Results 
In order to assess the effects of the scheme of incentives and sanctions, six separate Suits indexes 
have been calculated using the overall average municipal income (see Table 6) and the respective 
curves are represented in Figure 7.  
 
Figure II-0-7 
FIGURE 7  Suits indexes of waste taxation for the municipalities in the study area 
Notes: All individuals are assigned with the average income of their municipality and, therefore, cumulated income is 
sorted by municipality on the horizontal axis. The grey line represents a proportional distribution of the tax burden 
between the municipalities. The yellow line represents the distribution of the tax burden in 2014, prior to the waste 
taxation reform discussed in this paper. The sage green line depicts a hypothetical poll tax with a total revenue that is 
equivalent to the projected 2019 tax burden and that we propose as a notable example of regressive taxation. The red 
line and the green line represent the projected 2019 national landfill tax and the regional sanction. The blue line is the 




As a consequence of using one average income for each municipality, the horizontal axis is 
sorted by income and by municipality conjointly, meaning that all taxpayers from the 
municipality with the lowest average income populate the first section of the axis, followed by 
all taxpayers of the second lowest and so forth. 
Table II-6. Suits indexes of waste taxationTable II-0-6 
Tax Suits index 
Tax on landfill disposal -0.11992 
Regional sanction -0.30379 
Additional tax burden -0.17158 
2014 TARI -0.0054 
Poll tax -0.03975 
Source: Own calculation with data from the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance (MEF) 
 
The grey diagonal represents a proportional distribution of the tax burden between all 
municipalities in the study area and a SUITS index of 0. The two curves closer to the grey diagonal 
represent, respectively, the 2014 TARI tax (i.e. waste taxation without the new scheme) and the 
hypothetical 2019 provincial poll tax introduced in the previous section and are the benchmark 
for the performance related scheme. The 2014 TARI is the observed distribution of the tax burden 
across municipalities: its fairness depends on how average income, population and waste 
taxation were distributed across municipalities in the study area at the latest available date. 
Furthermore, given the prescription of full cost coverage, the 2014 TARI Suits index shows the 
fairness implications of full cost coverage. The 2019 poll tax represents the fairness of the 
additional burden introduced by the scheme if all discrimination between municipalities was 
removed. It is nonetheless a typically regressive form of taxation and an unlikely policy solution, 
as it clearly violates the legislation principle according to which the polluter pays. However, it 
provides, by comparison, a very convenient measure of how much unfairness in projected 2019 
environmental sanctions is due to discriminating municipalities according to their diversion 
percentage. At this stage, the Suits indexes of both are very close to full proportionality, indicating 
that the variability of average income across municipalities is not high enough to generate 
substantial regressiveness. The performance related taxation scheme, on the other hand, shows 
regressive effects from mild, in the case of the tax on landfill disposal, to moderate in the case of 
the regional sanction.  It is noteworthy that much of the emerging inequity is concentrated on 
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mid-income municipalities, so that about the poorest half of the municipalities suffer over 80% of 
the tax burden.  
This first step of the analysis has the advantage of being directly focused on a comparison 
between municipalities, but it also comes with some limitations. The detail level of regressiveness 
effects, using just the average municipal income, is not very accurate. Furthermore, the 





FIGURE 8  Suits indexes of waste taxation for the municipalities in the study area 
Notes: All individuals are assigned with the average income of their income group in their municipality and, therefore, 
cumulated income is no longer sorted by municipality on the horizontal axis. The grey line represents a proportional 
distribution of the tax burden between the municipalities. The yellow line represents the distribution of the tax burden 
in 2014, prior to the waste taxation reform discussed in this paper. The sage green line depicts a hypothetical poll tax 
with a total revenue that is equivalent to the projected 2019 tax burden and that we propose as a notable example of 
regressive taxation. The red line and the green line represent the projected 2019 national landfill tax and the regional 
sanction. The blue line is the combination of both. 
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Therefore, in Figure 8, the analysis is replicated with the full amount of information available 
about personal income, moving the focus from inter-municipal inequity to inter-personal 
inequity before intra-municipal redistribution of the tax burden.  
 
Table II-7. Suits indexes of waste taxationTable II-0-7 
Tax Suits index 
Tax on landfill disposal -0.41684 
Regional sanction -0.43897 
Additional tax burden -0.40784 
2014 TARI -0.38166 
Poll tax -0.39261 
Source: Own calculation with data from the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance (MEF) 
 
The resulting analysis is much finer grained and reflects the additional source of inequality as a 
result of the fact that the distribution of average income of income classes is much more complex 
than what the overall average municipal income could tell. 
As a consequence of this more detailed approach, the horizontal axis is now sorted so that 
individuals of the lowest income class in the municipality where such class has the lowest average 
income populate the first section of the axis, followed by individuals of the lowest income class 
in the municipality where such class has the second lowest average income and so on. 
When a more detailed distribution of income is taken into account, the Suits index of the 2014 
TARI tax (see Table 7) is -0.38 and that of the capitation tax is -0.39, meaning that a distribution 
of the tax burden between municipalities  according to their costs of waste management provision 
is a bit more progressive than a capitation tax. In any case, at this point, the two taxes show a 
rather severe degree of unfairness, as the lowest quintile of income distribution pays for about 
50% of the tax burden. Finding that TARI is less regressive than a capitation tax even without 
intra-municipal redistribution is not overly surprising: it seems reasonable that less affluent 
municipalities tend to control their costs more tightly. It is remarkable, instead, that the difference 
is not great even if a capitation tax is so severely regressive and it is unclear if the further, intra-
municipal redistribution of the burden that we are not taking into account can ultimately 
compensate this.      
76 
 
The red curve represents the forecast of the 2019 special tax on landfill disposal. The tax is more 
regressive than both of our benchmarks, with a Suits index of -0.41. By visual inspection of Figure 
8, it is possible to identify that it is the second quintile of the income distribution that pays much 
of the price of increased regressiveness, followed by the third quintile. 
The green curve marks the cumulated burden of the forecast 2019 regional sanction. It closely 
follows the burden distribution of the special tax for landfill disposal, but in fact there are subtle 
differences: municipalities with more than 45% of diversion don’t pay at all, whereas 
municipalities below the threshold pay a sanction that depends both on total waste production 
and on sorted waste. As a matter of fact, the regional sanction is more regressive than the tax on 
landfill disposal and the most regressive of the group, with a Suits index of -0.44.  
The blue curve describes the combination of the tax on landfill disposal and the regional sanction, 
that is, the forecasted increase in tax burden due to the scheme of incentives and sanctions and it 
Suits index is -0.42. 
Before the intra-municipal redistribution of the tax burden takes place, all tax schemes are very 
distant from proportionality. Specifically, the poll tax is markedly regressive, taxation based on 
full cost coverage is slightly less regressive and incentives and sanctions based on diversion 
percentage are more regressive. However, while full cost coverage responds to a policy goal, 
diversion percentage is a very poor proxy of environmental sustainability in waste management 
and the resulting increase in regressiveness seems unjustified. 
 
5 Comments  
As service providers, waste management systems have a clear institutional goal (sustainable 
waste disposal) but no direct performance indicator. The concept of sustainability in waste 
management has to be split into disparate elements and only then, some assembly of the available 
measurable elements can be put to use as a performance metric.  
Even so, with the assemblage of different indicators being necessary to get to a synthetic 
evaluation parameter, this remains in all evidence a multi-dimensional problem. The lack of a 
strong, positive correlation between waste management indicators suggests, on one hand, that 
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simplified evaluations with just one or few dimensions can be very inaccurate in measuring actual 
sustainability. When put to the test, more than 60% of performance ranks in our set of waste 
management systems proved to be a consequence of the choice of one specific performance 
indicator over others and, consequently, unrelatable to overall sustainability. On the other hand, 
it raises a red flag because unidimensional evaluations are likely to be not just bad but also biased. 
A taxation scheme built on a single indicator favors some and penalizes others, potentially 
affecting the distribution of the tax burden between municipalities and between income groups. 
It also affects policies, at the advantage of those local governments following a certain 
sustainability approach (like increasing diversion) over those emphasizing a different one (e.g. 
reducing waste production). Even if any of these distortions may be acceptable in the light of a 
policy objective like sustainable waste disposal, when there is no coincidence between 
sustainability and its selected proxy, the rationale for tolerating the distortions becomes unclear.   
If the burden of waste taxation is adjusted by national and regional governments according to 
environmental performance evaluations, biased evaluations may subtract resources to 
communities that are not necessarily managing urban waste badly but have a lower income, 
ultimately making improvements harder to achieve. When the adjustment affects the distribution 
of the burden between local governments rather than between individuals, as in the case 
presented here, this could also have consequences on fiscal competition, inducing location 
patterns on households and on economic activities that could reinforce the bias.  
Fairness considerations aside, the most evident consequence of selecting diversion rate as the 
single performance indicator is encouraging measure fixation on an indicator that is mostly blind 
to the environmental consequences of landfill disposal: given a certain diversion rate, any amount 
of waste sent to landfill is possible with limited consequences. This is likely to produce effects 
regardless of taxation, as local governments concentrate their efforts to pursue improvements in 
the key indicator selected by the legislation and, all the while, the relative visibility of the 
indicator also affects their reputation with the voters. Under these premises, in many supposedly 
virtuous and sustainable municipalities, dismayed residents will suddenly have to face, at some 
point in time, landfill expansion and landfill exhaustion, with all the related issues.  
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In the specific case of the Italian scheme of incentives and sanctions, some efficiency concerns, 
although not extensively discussed in this work, seem justified as well. Raising the cost that 
municipalities face for waste management by the way of regional and national landfill taxes, can 
be justified in the light of negative externalities generated by landfill disposal. Setting the tax rate 
according to diversion percentage, though, practically removes the Pigouvian relation between 
the social cost generated by each municipality, which is a function of its use of the landfill, and 
the rate payed for it.   
The legislators have several alternative approaches to look at, should they decide to embrace 
some form of multi-dimensional evaluation, and they should arguably refer to the vast literature 
on multi-criteria decision making (Zopounidis and Pardalos 2010) to ponder such alternatives.  
The most straightforward, but also the most demanding in terms of information, is the selection 
of an eco-economical model providing the weighting parameters for a weighted composite 
indicator of sustainability in waste management. This implies a more precise definition of 
sustainability, strong assumptions about the aggregation function underlying the composite 
indicator and even stronger about compensation of trade-offs between different performance 
indicators. However, it also provides a synthetic measure that can be used to define a tax rate. 
Other methods require less extensive assumptions about the relation between performance 
indicators and sustainability but still need weights, as is the case with non-compensatory 
aggregation procedures (Bouyssou 1986; Fishburn 1976). It should also be noted that they only 
produce rankings which may be unsuitable to define tax rates. The previously introduced notion 
of average height in partially ordered sets may also be useful as it requires neither weights, nor 
assumptions on aggregation functions and there are applications in literature where it is used for 
the similar task of comparing pollutants (Brüggemann and Annoni 2014). Further research is 
required to introduce information on distance in partially ordered sets, without which only ranks 
can be obtained.  
Multi-indicator evaluations may have different degrees of complexity and, because of that, they 
may in some cases be less appealing for decision makers. However, complexity in evaluation 
reflects complexity in the objectives of the organization and therefore it seems reasonable to 
ultimately base evaluations on a small group of proper performance indicators. The availability 
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and quality of data is also a requirement and, again, this doesn’t seem to lead to higher costs as 
at least some performance indicators are already being collected and, in the case of diversion rate, 
they are extensively used. Furthermore, diversion rate is in itself a rather complex measure which 
requires the same information that would be needed for a very reasonable two-indicator 
evaluation (diversion rate and landfill disposal per capita).  
The shortcomings of performance evaluation based on diversion rate may affect a relatively small 
portion of waste taxation, but the potential distortions on policies are remarkable and waste 
legislations would certainly benefit from a multi-indicator approach to sanctions and incentives 
for waste management performance. 
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 CHAPTER III 






Since the end of World War II, maximizing GDP has been the primary policy goal of almost every 
country around the world. Nevertheless, over the same period, some politicians, economic 
experts and scientists have warned about the limitations of GDP as an indicator and sometimes 
have spoken against its use, particularly as a proxy of well-being. Notoriously, one of the initial 
proponents of GDP, Nobel Prize economist Simon Kuznets, denied that national welfare could 
be directly inferred from GDP, a measure of national income (Kuznets 1934). Starting in the 1970s, 
works by Richard Easterlin, Fred Hirsch and Tibor Scitovsky cast doubts on the relationship 
between income, consumption and well-being (Diener 2000; Welsch 2009) and, consequently, on 
the effects of GDP-increasing policies on well-being. Some of their conclusions have been 
challenged by influential economists22. Even though the issue can be considered controversial 
(Easterlin 2015; Stevenson and Wolfers 2013), a branch of economics now assumes that income is 
neutral to well-being at least for income levels that satisfy basic needs. Several personalities have 
pledged for a more diverse set of targets for public policies (among which, famously, Robert F. 
Kennedy in a 1968 speech on Gross National Product) or for a more multi-dimensional approach 
to welfare measurement, an endeavor spanning from a well-known work by Nordhaus and Tobin 
(1972) to the recent Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report (Stiglitz et al. 2010). Many works of this group 
typically start from a theory of why income does not explain well-being under certain conditions 
and propose a new dimension of well-being that is then tested empirically. This is the case, for 
example, with all the recent literature on relational goods (Becchetti et al. 2008, 2011; Bruni and 
Stanca 2008; Gui and Stanca 2010; Stanca 2009): according to the theory, income stops “buying” 
well-being at a certain level because every additional unit is obtained with longer working times 
and is used to buy a greater proportion of positional goods (which do not increase well-being) at 
the expense of free time which would otherwise be spent acquiring relational goods, that 
positively influence well-being. Other authors, more drastically, have claimed that GDP should 
                                                     
22 See Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), the subsequent comments by Becker, Rayo and Krueger (2008) and, with 
different arguments, Oswald (2008).   
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be replaced, rather than integrated, as a policy target (Costanza et al. 2009; Kahneman et al. 2004; 
Kubiszewski et al. 2013).  
In recent times, national and international institutions have cautiously moved in the direction 
suggested by GDP critics: a vast choice of indicators has been developed to complement GDP in 
measuring well-being, as a reference for policy decisions and to inform the policy debate and 
engage citizens (like the UN’s Human Development Index, the Cobb-Daly Genuine Progress 
Indicator, or OECD’s Better Life Index and, in Italy, ISTAT’s BES). The recent formulation of 
sustainable development goals seems to indicate that a policy shift of some sorts has been 
embraced. The process has been called “beyond GDP” approach (Costanza et al. 2014, 2009; 
Fleurbaey 2009). 
Among the proponents of the “beyond GDP” framework, there is substantial agreement on one 
point: well-being must be a multidimensional construct and a correct identification of its 
dimensions and their interactions can support better policy decisions. Beyond this, however, 
many aspects remain unclear.  
 
1) The endeavor of measuring well-being has yet to identify or build a single, agreed 
indicator to measure overall progress in well-being (for an extensive review of the 
different metrics see OECD (2013) but some measures of perceived well-being derived 
from large-scale surveys, like “happiness”, “life-satisfaction” and “subjective well-being” 
have raised considerable interest; 
2) So far, national and international initiatives building on these measures have treated 
perceived well-being as one dimension alongside others in the multidimensional concept 
of well-being (OECD 2013, 2014); however, proponents of such measures haven’t been as 
stringent in characterizing the role of perceived well-being (Diener 2000; Kahneman et al. 
2004; Oishi and Diener 2014); as a matter of fact, SWB literature frequently presents 
perceived well-being as a much encompassing proxy of well-being23 and as a response to 
ill-advised GDP-maximizing policies;  
                                                     
23 “Unlike economic indicators, which locate a person’s well-being primarily in the material realm of marketplace 
production and consumption, well- being indicators assess the full range of inputs to the quality of life, from social 
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3) In fact, there is no consensus on the validity of these measures (Bond and Lang 2014; 
Diener et al. 2013; Heine et al. 2002; Jorm and Ryan 2014; Krueger and Schkade 2008) and 
there is some disagreement about their degree of equivalence (Jurado and Perez-Mayo 
2012; Welsch 2009); furthermore, while the distinctness of “beyond GDP” approaches 
from orthodox utilitarianism is a very relevant qualification for some proponents of the 
“beyond GDP” approach, in the case of perceived well-being the distinction is rather 
blurred because the point of view is typically hedonic24;  
4) There is no consensus on the components or determinants of well-being even after a great 
variety of plausible dimensions have been proposed, looking at the spheres of 
socioeconomic welfare, psychology and lifestyle, human/relational environment, natural 
environment and more;  
5) The lack of consensus depends to some degree on the longstanding and unresolved 
discussion on whether different forms of capital (economic and social capital, manmade 
and natural capital, etc.) are substitutes or complements (or any combination of the two)25;  
6) Correspondingly, it also depends on disagreements about potential trade-offs between 
different determinants of well-being and their substitutability so that, in general, it is 
unclear how the components should be compared and if they should be compared at all;     
7) Finally, existing estimates about the determinants of well-being are frequently affected by 
scarce multidimensionality or, otherwise, by endogeneity issues.   
 
At present, a “beyond GDP” approach requires, at least, advancements in two directions.  
The first is a better specification of which indicator of well-being can be the object of rigorous 
measurements and, consequently, of maximization efforts; this goes beyond the scope of our 
work.  
                                                     
relationships to spirituality and meaning, from material consumption to feelings of relaxation and security”, (Diener 
and Tov 2012, p. 3) 
24 Attempts of putting subjective well-being at the center of policy decision making have well documented 
foundations in Bentham’s quantitative hedonism (Kahneman and Riis 2005). For a distinction between hedonic and 
eudaimonic research on well-being see, for instance, Deci and Ryan (2008)  
25 See for example Beckerman (1994) and Daly (1995) on manmade and natural capital. 
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In order to test the feasibility of one specific measure alternative to GDP, we will adopt subjective 
well-being (SWB) as a reference indicator26 because of the influential opinions supporting its use 
as a major policy target (Diener and Tov 2012; Kahneman et al. 2004). The measure of SWB we 
adopt has the distinctive quality of being part of the OECD database of social indicators (OECD 
2014), which is also the source of much of the data used throughout this work, and thus has the 
advantage of being homogeneous in terms of methodology and that of having documented 
institutional relevance27. In the short term, these qualities seem to make this metric the more likely 
well-being indicator to have an impact on policy decision. The choice of some other metric of 
perceived well-being, as those discussed in point 1, above, or those mentioned in OECD (2013), 
would obviously be possible, with results not necessarily equivalent to those presented in this 
paper, even though some additional issues in terms of reliability and validity should arguably be 
addressed in that case (OECD 2013, p. 28-59). Additionally, it is common ground that the use of 
any subjective measure of well-being as the criterion to assess specific policies can be criticized 
by philosophers and economists on many grounds, including objections to hedonic well-being. 
This, we argue, is a matter for future research: drastic departures from the utilitarian paradigm 
implied by SWB would require consensus on a strong and testable alternative conceptual model, 
but such consensus has yet to be reached.  
The second advancement required for going “beyond GDP”, once the decision is made on some 
metric of well-being, is the identification of convincing evidence on the dependence of such 
indicator from any policy-controlled measurable attribute (of individuals or communities) other 
than GDP. This last point is the focus of our work.  
Our intent is to model the average national value of SWB across OECD member countries using 
three large sets of indicators on society, environment and time-use, which broadly cover many of 
the proposed multidimensional integrations to GDP. The innovative content of our proposal 
concerns, first, the specification of the well-being problem and consists in applying a method, 
derived from partial order theory and recently applied to socio-economic issues (Fattore 2016), 
                                                     
26 For the source of data and the metric of SWB used here, see section 2.1.  
27 In other words, it has already been used as a major component of the “quantitative evidence on the social 
situation” (OECD 2014, p. 78) used by very relevant institutions.  
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which we argue to be more effective than a battery of indicators or, at the opposite, of a synthetic 
indicator. The specification we provide is not meant to be conclusive, meaning that better 
explanatory variables can ultimately be found, but the method is a good benchmark for future 
research. Furthermore, the results we obtain modeling SWB with the three sets of explanatory 
indicators provide at least some conclusive evidence on the prospects of improving perceived 
well-being by acting on the typical institutional indicators concerning “beyond GDP” 
dimensions. 
The paper is organized as follows. 
In section 2, we present the indicators used in this work and the thematic framework according 
to which they are divided, followings the example of an OECD database on social indicators and 
extending it to environmental and time-use indicators. We also discuss at some length the 
properties of data concerning the specific metric of SWB that we are using and we make the case 
for modeling it as a discrete variable.  
In section 3, we provide a brief overview of the method, which is then detailed in subsection 3.2, 
where we present Hasse diagrams, partial order scalograms with base coordinates and local 
partial order models; all three are partial order methods that we combine in order to deal with 
multidimensionality. In subsection 3.3 we briefly present ordered logistic regression models and 
post-estimation tests for the validity of these models assumptions and for the comparison of 
different models. 
In section 4, we present results for all steps of our method. First, we show the output of Hasse 
diagrams and POSAC, which are graphical representations of dimensional reduction procedures 
that preserve partial order. In our work, these methods are used to analyze the sets of indicators 
and to identify variables that have to be dropped in order to ensure that each thematic group of 
indicators is partially ordered to an acceptable degree. Then, a further dimensional reduction is 
performed using local partial order models, this time with the intent of using the output 
dimensions for the subsequent parts of the analysis. Finally, the section presents the outcome of 
several ordered logit models that use SWB as the dependent variable and the dimensions 
produced in the previous steps as explanatory variables. 
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In section 5 we discuss the results, focusing on post-estimation tests, on the interpretation of the 
ordered logit models, on the statistical significance and on the sign of the coefficients. 
In section 6 we look at the broader meaning of our results, drawing conclusions in terms of 
validity of different indicators and thematic groups of indicators as drivers of SWB and 
commenting on the effectiveness of the corresponding theories about well-being; we also discuss 
the implications of our results when it comes to deciding if a multidimensional definition of SWB 
is a better policy target than GDP and which policy recommendations are likely to come from its 
use.  
Our results are consistent with the view that SWB is multidimensional and some factors other 
than GDP clearly emerge, so that a statistical model predicting SWB in OECD countries does not 
strictly require an income indicator; however we found no evidence in support of several 
theoretical assumptions concerning “beyond GDP” approaches and about half of those “beyond 
GDP” factors that we found significant are unlikely to lead to major policy shifts. 
 
2. Data 
Four criteria guided the selection of data for this research. First, we identified a single source, in 
order to obtain the best possible consistency in collection methods. As a source, OECD also 
ensures a strong theoretical background to all indicators published on its website and has less 
missing data than other comparable sources. Second, data referred to OECD countries are 
generally clustered around the top section of the curve of SWB as a function of national GDP, i.e. 
around the countries that, based on the Easterlin paradox, should have little benefit for additional 
income and much benefit from other things. Third, we selected datasets and specific indicators 
that we see as credible representatives of the universe of all measures conceived or proposed to 
adjust or replace GDP as a measure of national progress. There is no ambition to make a full 
taxonomy of such measures and to include all of them in the attempt to model the national levels 
of SWB. A selected, multidimensional group of a few dozen seems enough to evaluate if existing 
knowledge about “beyond GDP” factors affecting SWB is substantive and established. Finally, 
data selection is organized in the perspective of dimensional reduction. Groups of the selected 
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indicators are supposed to be related to common underlying constructs or latent variables and 
such relation should have a well-defined theoretical background. That is the case when the 
indicators are already organized in groups in their database of origin and the group is labelled 
with a very precise theoretically defined concept. This assumption is even more important 
because of the methodology applied in this work, and this is discussed at length in the methods 
section. Needless to say, as our intent is assessing the performance of “beyond GDP” indicators, 
data on GDP per capita will be occasionally used for comparison purposes.  
 
2.1 Social indicators 
The OECD database of Social Indicators (OECD-DSI) consists of five groups of five national 
indicators each. The indicators cover 34 member countries and are included in the OECD annual 
publication “Society at a Glance”28 and the groups, reported in Table 1, represent the domains of 
general socio-demographic context, self-sufficiency, equity, health and social cohesion; out of the 
five groups, at least four clearly imply an underlying construct. At a later stage of this work, the 
first group will lose a couple of variables, and those left will be clearly related to the sphere of 
demography, so from this point on we will use the more accurate term “demography” (dem) to 
label the group.  
Notably, the social cohesion group includes an indicator which is a national average of survey 
responses concerning life satisfaction on an 11-step ladder (from 0 to 10). It comes from the Gallup 
World Poll and is one of the standard reference indicators for SWB, even though there are 
terminological discrepancies in literature concerning the equivalence of terms like subjective 
well-being, life satisfaction and happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2005; Jorm and Ryan 2014; Welsch 
2007). This specific indicator is a very appropriate choice as the response variable in our models. 
The reference year for the SWB indicator is 2012 and this dictates the reference year for the entire 
work. Actually, each indicator has its own national collection schedule and, consequently, in 
some cases, the latest data are older or more recent than 2012. We expect this to have negligible 
effects on our results as the indicators will be converted in ranks. Occasional missing data is 
                                                     
28 http://www.oecd.org/social/statistics.htm . See the publication for definitions and methodology. 
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handled with pairwise deletion in all correlation analyses; as for model inputs, missing ranks 
(due to missing data) are estimates based on the ranking of the same country in the most 
correlated variable of the same group. 
 





Equity Health Social cohesion 
(Soccohes) 
Household 
disposable income b 
Employment e Income inequality b Life expectancy c Tolerance d 
Fertility c Unemployment e  Poverty b  Perceived health c Confidence in 
institutions d 
Net migration c NEET Youth d Living on benefits c Suicide c Safety and crime d 
Marriages and civil 
partnerships b 
Expected years in 
retirement d 
Social spending e Public health 
expenditure c 
Helping others d 





of-work benefits b 
Public coverage for 
healthcare c 
 
a All indicators are at the latest update as in the mentioned 2014 OECD publication. 
b Reported year is 2010  
c Reported year is 2011  
d Reported year is 2012 
e Reported year is 2013 
 
The SWB indicator has some remarkable characteristics that should be mentioned. Observed 
values in reference year vary between 4.7 and 7.8 and, if ordered, the average difference between 
consecutive countries is below 0.1. In the entire time series between 2001 and 2014, values are 
confined between a minimum of 3.9 in 2012 Greece and a maximum of 8.4 in 2014 Denmark and 
very few countries ever fall outside of the interval between 5 and 7; yearly changes of more than 
0.5 are very rare (less than 2%); only 7% of the countries changed by more than 1 point in 13 years 
and 66% of countries changed by less than 0.5.  
In other words, national life satisfaction is extremely persistent; in fact, in most countries, its 
partial autocorrelation is statistically significant at one or more time lags.  
There is ongoing debate on whether SWB measures are comparable across different cultures and 
languages (Jorm and Ryan 2014; OECD 2013). Actually, the evolution of SWB in OECD countries 
looks very much as if it depended on some factor that is approximately constant in the timespan 
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of a decade, precisely like culture and language. However, several authors (Ed Diener and Oishi 
2000; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004) claim that there is enough evidence to assume that a 1-
step distance on a 11-step Likert scale is meaningful in cross-language and cross-culture 
comparisons. Finding a solution to this dilemma is beyond the scope of our work; in any case, 
existing literature provides some evidence that the bias is not extensive (OECD 2013) in micro 
data, at a national level between groups, and up to a 1-step difference for a discrete variable, but 
there is no ground for assuming that validity holds in the case of differences of about 0.1 on a 
continuous variable.  We argue that, even if language and culture were not cause of a significant 
bias, fractional differences across nations should be handled with great care by social scientists. 
Therefore, we will convert the SWB variable into: 
 
a) an approximately equal-width discrete variable with three levels: one for scores of 7 and 
above, one for scores of 6 and above but below 7 and one for scores of 5 or above but 
below 6, plus Hungary (4.7); 
b) an equal-width discrete variable with seven levels, with each level of width 0.5, starting 
from 4.5. 
 
The results we present in the paper show no sensitivity to the number of levels in terms of 
coefficient signs of statistically significant variables and minor sensitivity in terms of which 
coefficients are statistically significant. As further evidence that the discretization is not a source 
of bias, linear regressions using the continuous variable, and stepwise procedures to identify the 
strongest regressors in such a linear regression provide results that are consistent with our 
models.  
Furthermore, we want to control for the possibility that current differences in SWB between 
countries are the result of events long past. Consequently, we will use a lag variable called 
swb_0509 which consists of observed values of SWB between 2005 and 2009 as reported in the 




2.2 Environmental indicators 
Environmental indicators (OECD-DEI) are built from the OECD online data library29. In this case 
using the entire database was not possible:  a number of indicators and entire categories are 
difficult to compare across countries, not easily relatable to SWB or too thematically narrow. 
Furthermore, the quality of data is unquestionably lower of that in OECD-DSI because of missing 
data. As a consequence of the limitations of this dataset we had to drop a country (Israel) and 
some countries have one or more indicators that were last updated several years ago. In spite of 
this, it was possible to build two additional groups of indicators that deserve to be part of a 
multidimensional study of SWB (Table 2).  
 
Table III-2. The OECD database of Environmental Indicators (OECD-DSI)TableIII-0-2 
Pollution and consumption of non-
renewables 
Green policy and green production 
Population exposure to air pollution by 
fine particles (PM2.5)  b 
Environmental taxation (Per Capita) f 
Pesticides produced (per unit of GDP)  c Renewable energy production (%) 
Municipal waste (Per Capita)  d Wastewater treatment (% connected) g 
Freshwater abstractions (Per Capita) e Organic farming (% agricultural land 
under certified management) h 
a All indicators are relative to 2013 unless otherwise indicated 
b Three years average of reference years 2010-2012 
c Reported year is 2010 except for Luxembourg (1999), for Australia, Canada, Greece and 
Spain (2006), for the United States (2007), for Chile and Iceland (2008), for Japan and New 
Zealand (2009) 
d Reported year is 2012 except for Australia and Chile (2009), for Japan (2010) and for Canada 
(2009, household municipal waste only) 
e Reported year is 2012 where not otherwise specified; Austria, (1995), Iceland, South Korea 
(2005), Finland (2006), Norway, Portugal (2007), Italy (2008), Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Japan 
(2009), Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, United States (2010), Australia (2011), 
Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (2013) 
f On revenue of fiscal year 2012, reported year for Greece is 2011 
g Reported year is 2004 (Australia, estimate), 2008 (United States), 2009 (Belgium, Canada, 
Italy, Portugal), 2010 (Germany, Iceland, United Kingdom), 2011 (Chile, Ireland, Japan), 2012 
(Austria, Estonia, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey) 
h Reported year is 2007 (Greece), 2008 (Italy), 2012 (Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, 
Mexico, South Korea, Spain) 






The first group consists of four indicators that measure different forms of pollution and 
consumption of non-renewable resources. The second group measures the intensity of 
environmental policies and some kinds of “green” production. The need for two different groups 
is rather evident: based on the existing literature on SWB and environment, we expect the first 
group to be inversely related to SWB whereas the second should be directly related; we also 
anticipate the first group to strongly favor poor and developing countries while the second tilts 
the analysis towards the developed countries. 
 
2.3 Time-use indicators 
The database of time use indicators (OECD-DTUI) was extracted from the OECD gender data 
portal30; methodological documentation on the national time use surveys from which this OECD 
database is built can be found in Miranda (2011).  
 
Table III-3. The OECD database of Time Use Indicators (OECD-DTUI)aTableIII-0-3 
Uses compatible with production of 
relational goods 
Uses non compatible with 
production of relational goods 
Care for household members Travel to and from work/study 
Participating /attending events Routine housework 
Visiting or entertaining friends Sleeping 
Eating and drinking Tv or radio at home 
a Reported year for Portugal is 1999, for Estonia and Hungary is 1999-2000, for Slovenia is 
2000-2001, for Denmark is 2001, for Germany is 2001-2002, for Poland is 2003-2004, for 
Belgium, Ireland and United Kingdom is 2005, for Netherlands is 2005-2006, for Australia 
and Turkey is 2006, for Austria and Italy is 2008-2009, for France, Korea and Mexico is 2009, 
for Finland, New Zealand and Spain is 2009-2010, for Canada, Norway, Sweden and United 
States is 2010, for Japan is 2011. 
 




In this case we have a further drop in data quality because of missing data and because the results 
are only approximately comparable, as the primary sources are national surveys. The database is 
nonetheless the standard reference for scientific literature on time use. As in the case of the OECD-
DEI, the OECD-DTUI is organized in groups that are not particularly useful for our research, 
mixing indicators of relational use of time with others that suggest non-relational use or have no 
implications on relationality. Table 3 presents our reorganization of some indicators in two 
groups that seem the most effective to represent relational and non-relational time use. These 
indicators are available for a total of 26 OECD countries. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Overview of the methodology 
Our intent is to transform the available datasets of indicators into a compact group of meaningful 
and clearly interpretable regressors and to explore models of SWB based on them. In order to 
avoid endogeneity issues, which quickly become uncontrollable in highly multidimensional 
models, we perform a dimensional reduction, shrinking the set to a manageable number of 
variables. However, in doing so, we neither use weighted linear aggregations, which imply 
arbitrary weightings, nor the common data-driven methods of dimensional reduction, which 
frequently incur in the issue of having, as output, nameless and artificial dimensions that cannot 
justify one or few specific policy strategies over others. We instead apply a method, derived from 
the theory of partially ordered sets, which requires no assumptions about the importance of the 
indicators aggregated in a single dimension and, at the same time, produces a synthetic 
dimension which has no ambiguity of interpretation because it is, as much as possible, order-
preserving with respect to ranks built on all the indicators synthesized in it. As explained in the 
following subsection, the main requirement for this process is that there is a relatively consistent 
latent dimension underlying each group.  From this, we obtain a set of variables that form a 
plausible model of policy-controllable drivers of SWB; we compare the predictions of national 
average SWB made with such model with those that can be made using GDP alone. This process 








adequate partial orders 
Hasse diagrams and partial order scalogram 
analyses with base coordinates are used 
jointly, as graphical tools, to study if each 
group of indicators (see Table 1-3) can be 
dimensionally reduced to a single dimension 
representing the concept in the group label 
(e.g. self-sufficiency). If the graphical 
representation of the new dimension shows a 
reasonable amount of partial order, the 
process moves to the following step. If not, the 
output is used to identify which indicator is 
most inconsistent with the existence of a single 
latent variable (based on weak monotonicity 
coefficients) and we drop that indicator 
Step 2 
Definition of the final 
set of independent 
variables 
The groups resulting from the previous phase 
are finally transformed into a final set of 
independent variables using local partial 
order models 
Step 3 
Estimation of ordered 
logit models 
Discretized SWB is estimated across OECD 
countries using the set of variables defined in 
the previous step as regressors in ordered logit 
models 
 
The first step uses partial order tools designed to allow dimensional reduction, but its actual goal 
is to study if each group of indicators (corresponding to each column in Tables 1-3) allows to 
create some partial ordering of countries. That ordering is, in fact, a latent variable behind the 
group of indicators. The interpretation of such latent variable is relatively easy: it can be identified 
with the concept expressed in the name of each group. When the ordering is insufficient, a 
variable is identified as the least consistent with the existence of a single latent variable and is 
dropped; then the procedure is repeated. It should be noted that, at this stage, partial order tools 
are not used to obtain the quantitative value of the latent variable for the following analysis: we 
are just interested in a graphical representation of the partial order.  
The second step consists of performing dimensionality reduction through a different partial order 
method. The OECD-DSI will be reduced to a group of five indicators, following the OECD 
classification, whereas the OECD-DEI will be reduced to two indicators following our own 
interpretation of the available data and the OECD-DTUI will be reduced to two indicators that 
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best represent the concepts of production/consumption of relational and non-relational goods.  
The third step will consist of modelling and model comparison. 
   
3.2 Partial Order Methods 
In Partial Order theory, a set is defined as “linearly (or totally) ordered” when all the pairs of its 
elements are linked by an order relation. More generally, we have a “partially ordered set” (or 
POSET) when some pairs of its elements are linked by an order relation, but not necessarily all of 
them. That is the case with many multi-indicator systems, when their purpose is to provide a 
single ranking for a set of elements defined by their scores in several different attributes. In such 
a set, two elements can be ordered if all the attribute scores of one element are higher of all the 
attribute scores of the other. Otherwise, the two elements are called “incomparable” and, because 
of their presence, a complete ranking of the set to which they belong would be impossible without 
further elaboration.  
A great variety of methods is available to force some complete ranking on a POSET, from 
composite indicators to Principal Component Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling. However, 
there are remarkable benefits in deliberately applying, instead, Partial Order Methods both for 
the analysis and for the definition of a complete ranking; a comprehensive overview of the 
available tools can be found in Brüggemann and Patil (2011), whereas this paper will focus on 
those that are more relevant for our research issue. 
 
1. Partial Order Methods like Local Partial Order Model (LPOM) allow dimensionality 
reduction in the multi-indicator system down to a single dimension, exactly like weighted 
linear aggregations and other methods to produce composite indicators, but they require 
no arbitrary weighting; at the same time, tools like Hasse diagrams and partial order 
scalograms provide substantial awareness and control over compensation; 
2. Compared to common data-driven methods to reduce dimensionality like Principal 
Components Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling, LPOM is just as effective in 
reducing multicollinearity, sensitivity to model specification and overfitting issues in 
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models built on multi-indicator systems, but it produces more interpretable, less 
ambiguous outputs; 
3. Partial order can be applied without substantial a priori assumptions on the direction of 
causality between observed dimensions and output dimensions, which means that it is 
appropriate in reflective models, where multiple indicators are measured to make 
inferences on an underlying latent variable influencing them, as well as in formative 
models, where a convenient combination of multiple indicators is used to generate a 
synthetic measure31. 
 
Using Partial Order Methods on multi-indicator systems implies two assumptions. The indicators 
included in the system should ultimately refer to one underlying construct, either reflectively or 
formatively. In other words, they should “sample, or cover, the different aspects of a well-defined 
content universe” (Raveh and Landau 1993). A ranking based on indicators that have no common 
content universe (e.g. a ranking of countries based on average income and number of colors in 
their flag) may still be possible but would have no meaning. Furthermore, the relation between 
indicators and the underlying construct must be uniform in its direction from high to low (Shye 
1985). The first assumption works very well with the OECD-DSI: the 24 social indicators are 
organized in five groups, at least four of which can be easily referred to an underlying construct. 
The other two datasets were selected so that four more groups with as many underlying 
constructs could be identified in the domains of environmental and time-use data. The second 
assumption holds only in some cases and occasionally we will have to adjust the indicator to 
make directions uniform with respect to the underlying construct. 
Dimensionality reduction, regardless of the method of choice, can significantly benefit from some 
preliminary analytical steps allowed by Partial Order Methods, the first being the Hasse diagram 
(Brüggemann and Patil 2011).  
Suppose that matrix 𝑃𝑛 x 𝑚 describes a POSET of n elements with m attributes 𝑎1…𝑎𝑚. Each 





and, given the definition of 
                                                     








 ∀ 1 < t < m. Furthermore, profile 𝑎(ℎ) is said to cover 𝑎(𝑘) if 
there exists no third profile 𝑎(𝑧) in the POSET for which 𝑎(𝑘) < 𝑎(𝑧) < 𝑎(ℎ). A Hasse diagram 
represents each profile of the POSET as a node of a directed graph where all edges are directed 
upwards (and the direction can therefore be omitted) and is built according to the following rules: 
 
1) If 𝑎(𝑘) < 𝑎(ℎ), then 𝑎(𝑘)is below 𝑎(ℎ)in the drawing; 
2) If 𝑎(ℎ) covers 𝑎(𝑘), an edge is included between the two. 
 
Generally, profiles are arranged vertically in levels that depend on the structure of the graph and, 
when a profile could be located in several levels, the highest possible is selected. Figure 1 presents 
an example of Hasse diagram with just six profiles: 𝑎(𝑔) covers 𝑎(𝑘), 𝑎(ℎ),  𝑎(𝑙)  and 𝑎(𝑟), all of 




FIGURE 1  Hasse diagram  
 
Notably, in this example four profiles are not connected by an edge and lay on the same vertical 
level. This is the representation of incomparability in Hasse diagrams: we know that the three 
profiles are below 𝑎(𝑔) and they are above 𝑎(𝑠)but, based on available data, we cannot decide an 
order among them. As exploratory tools, Hasse diagrams are particularly helpful because of the 
number of levels they identified in a POSET. In fact, a POSET with n elements and n levels is a 
totally ordered set and the interdependence between the attributes is very high; if the POSET of 
a multi-indicator system has almost as many levels as elements, the multi-indicator system is 
redundant as most of the information would be still available in a system with just one indicator. 
At the opposite, if a multi-indicator system has a POSET with n elements and 1 level (with 𝑛 > 1), 
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all of its elements are incomparable and all of its indicators are not co-graduated; more generally, 
a POSET with very few levels provides little information on orderability and it is not particularly 
useful for the purpose of dimensional reduction with any dimensional reduction method. Based 
on these premises, before proceeding with dimensional reduction on the three datasets, we will 
make sure that each group of indicators to be aggregated has a POSET with a number of levels 
below n and reasonably greater than 1. 
Hasse diagrams provide useful visual information on the amounts of comparability in a POSET, 
but little in terms of interpretation. Ideally, before moving on with dimensionality reduction, we 
want to know more, particularly about incomparability: what makes specific pairs of profiles 
incomparable and how much incomparable they are. This is possible through a second Partial 
Order tool called POSAC or Partial Order Scalogram with base Coordinates32. 
POSAC is a tool for exploratory data analysis that extends the unidimensional Guttman scale 
(Guttman 1950). It provides a graphical representation of the same matrix 𝑃𝑛 x 𝑚 discussed above 
and consisting of the n elements of a POSET and their m attributes 𝑎1…𝑎𝑚 (with m>2) in a two-
dimensional space. While POSAC is, in itself, a method of dimensionality reduction, it is designed 
to provide an interpretable graphical representation rather than a formal description of the two 
resulting dimensions, and therefore it is mostly useful in the exploratory phase of the analysis. 
Compared to Principal Components Analysis, instead of trying to preserve distances, POSAC 
tries to preserve, as much as possible, order relations and incomparabilities between the elements 
(Brüggemann and Patil 2011).  
First, in each of the m columns of 𝑃𝑛 x 𝑚 , observed data are converted in ranks33. From this point 
on, only the relations between the observations are considered and not their magnitude, making 
the method robust to outliers and stable in front of slight changes in input data, and making 
different scales between attributes irrelevant. Conventionally, POSAC ranks observations so that 
small scores are assigned a high ranking, but the opposite result can be easily obtained and, as 
clarified in the results section, associating small scores with low rankings provides more intuitive 
                                                     
32 A detailed formalization of the mathematical background and the algorithm of POSAC can be found in Shye and 
Amar (1985) and Shye (1985) and the algorithm it is currently supported in the statistical package Systat. 




results and is therefore the method of choice in this work. Essentially, the POSAC algorithm 
calculates the weak monotonicity coefficients of all attributes and identifies the two attributes 









 consisting of its ranking in each attribute. The maximal and 
































where P is the observed population, are added to the set of observed profiles and placed on a 
Cartesian space in (1, 1) and (0, 0) respectively. The initial placement (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) of profile 𝑎
(𝑘) is 


















The coordinates are then appropriately translated to fit into [0, 1]. Finally, the placement is 
improved through iterative two-step cycles that approximate the maximization of the number of 
profile pairs which are correctly represented in their order or incomparability relation (Shye 
1985).  
From the definition of orderable pair, we know that 
 




 𝑎(𝑘)ǁ 𝑎(ℎ)  ↔  {
𝑥𝑘 ≥ 𝑥ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑘  ≤  𝑦ℎ
𝑜𝑟
𝑥𝑘 ≤ 𝑥ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑘  ≥  𝑦ℎ
 (4) 
 
So, by construction, we expect from (1) and (3) that profiles with larger scores in all attributes will 
be placed closer to (1,1), towards the top right corner of the POSAC space, whereas profiles with 
smaller scores in all attributes will be closer to (0, 0). Form (2) and (4), instead, we can see how 
POSAC deals with profiles that have relatively large scores in some attributes and small scores in 
others and are, therefore, incomparable. Profiles with large scores of 𝑎𝑖 and small scores of 𝑎𝑗 will 
be placed close to the bottom right corner and, at the opposite, small scores of 𝑎𝑖 and large scores 
of 𝑎𝑗 will have them placed closer to the top left corner. Graphically, as in Figure 2, order and 
incomparability with respect to one profile 𝑎(ℎ) can be identified for each other profile by looking 




FIGURE 2  POSAC of partially ordered set represented in figure 1 
 
A further support to POSAC output analysis, particularly when an entire set is considered, is 
given by the following: 
 
 𝐽 =X+Y  (5) 
 




Partial Order literature refers to the J (or Joint) axis as the diagonal from (0, 0) to (1, 1) and the L 
(or Lateral) axis as the diagonal from (1, 0) to (0, 1). The two equations (5) and (6) describe the 
actual output dimensions of POSAC34, and the score of each profile on J and L is hence 
determined. The J axis has some substantial advantages over the output of a PCA: there are no 
factor loadings to consider in size or direction: if two comparable profiles have a different score 
in J, the one with the highest score has better scores in all the original indicators. Visually, groups 
of comparable profiles will be broadly aligned with the J axis and POSAC outputs that show 
general alignment with J are closer to an ordered set. At the opposite, ample alignment with L 
identifies a set that is largely not orderable.  
As we did with Hasse diagrams before, we can now point to the features of POSAC that are most 
relevant to this research. First, the position of profiles along the J axis is a good visual 
approximation of a total ranking. Second, the shape taken by the cloud of profiles along the J and 
the L axes can be used to cross-check indication on excess or lack of comparability in the POSET. 
Third and most importantly, some remarkable information on the nature of incomparability that 
could not be seen in the Hasse diagram in Figure 1 can be inferred from the graph: now we can 
say that 𝑎(𝑘) and 𝑎(𝑟) are not just incomparable, but also very different because they have opposite 
rankings in the two least positively correlated attributes. Obviously, by looking at the coefficients 
of weak monotonicity, we can identify which are the attributes that create such a difference. At 
the same time, 𝑎(𝑘) and 𝑎(𝑙), while incomparable, are much less different and form a cluster of 
profiles with relatively similar characteristics compared to the others.35 
A convenient application of Partial Order Methods to reduce a multi-indicator system to a single 
dimension is represented by the family of Local Partial Order Models (LPOMs) (Brüggemann and 
Patil 2011). Such models make use of the concepts of linear extension of a POSET and average 
height of a profile.  
                                                     
34 Clearly, by determining the coordinates (x, y) of each profile, POSAC attributes that profile a score on the J axis and 
a score on the L axis.  
35 In a Hasse diagram, the four incomparable profiles can be put side to side in any configuration and the method 
itself does not provide the information required to distinguish between the incomparability of 𝑎(𝑘) and 𝑎(𝑟) and that 
of 𝑎(𝑘) and 𝑎(𝑙) 
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Given a POSET P, like that represented as a Hasse diagram in Figure 1, a linear extension L of P 
is any linear order, of the same attributes of P, which preserves all the order relations found in P. 
In the case of P (Figure 1) the POSET contains nine order relations between profiles: 𝑎(𝑔) > 𝑎(𝑠),  
𝑎(𝑘), 𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) and 𝑎(𝑠) < 𝑎(𝑘),  𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟). Essentially, a linear extension will be obtained 
by attributing any order to all incomparable profiles 𝑎(𝑘),  𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) provided that the order 
relations with 𝑎(𝑔) and 𝑎(𝑠) are preserved (see Figure 3). Any partial order that is not a linear order 
will therefore have more than one linear extension and the average position of a profile in all 
linear extensions will depend on (and will carry substantial information about) the structure of 
the POSET. Formally, if 𝐻(𝑎(𝑘), 𝐿𝑣) is the height of a profile 𝑎
(𝑘) in the v-th linear extension, the 









where 𝐿𝑇 is the number of all linear extensions in the POSET (Brüggemann and Patil 2011). If 
ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘)) is a known quantity, the POSET can be linearly ordered according to it as it would 
happen with a composite indicator but without any need for arbitrary weights (Brüggemann and 
Carlsen 2011).  
However, the number of all linear extensions in a POSET is 1 ≤ LT ≤ n!  (Brüggemann and Carlsen 
2011) and determining all of them is a combinatorial exercise (Lerche et al. 2003) that quickly 
becomes computationally impossible as 𝑛 grows (Brüggemann et al. 2004).  
In order to overcome this issue, several methods to approximate ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘)) have been proposed36 
among which LPOMs, that are being progressively developed to allow approximations with the 
least possible distortion effects (Brüggemann and Carlsen 2011). For the sake of simplicity and 
given the findings in Brüggemann and Annoni (2014) we will make use of the first LPOM to be 
developed, called LPOM0 (Brüggemann et al. 2004), which was empirically shown to be not 
necessarily a worse approximation than the others. Looking at the POSET in figures 1, 3 as an 
example, the idea behind the approximation is the following: the average height of, say, profile 
                                                     
36 For an extensive list with detailed comparison see Brüggemann and Patil (2011) and Brüggemann et al. (2005). 
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𝑎(𝑘), depends first of all on profiles that are certainly ordered above it (𝑎(𝑔)) and on profiles 
certainly ordered below it (𝑎(𝑠)). The precise order of profiles above and profiles below is 
irrelevant, i.e. any linear extension of the subsets above and below 𝑎(𝑘) will produce the same 
outcome. Then, the average height of 𝑎(𝑘)depends on the method selected to merge incomparable 
profiles 𝑎(ℎ), 𝑎(𝑙), 𝑎(𝑟) with the others. The approximation consists in treating all the incomparable 
profiles as a single object that can be assigned to any position above or below 𝑎(𝑘).  
Let (𝑎(𝑘)) and 𝐹(𝑎(𝑘)), or 𝑂 and 𝐹 for brevity, be the principal downset and upset of 𝑎(𝑘), i.e., 
respectively, the subset of the POSET P containing 𝑎(𝑘) and all 𝑎(ℎ) ≤ 𝑎(𝑘) or all 𝑎(ℎ) ≥ 𝑎(𝑘). 
Furthermore, let 𝑈(𝑎(𝑘)), or 𝑈, be the subset of P containing all elements incomparable to 𝑎(𝑘). 
Finally, following a common convention in LPOMs literature, let ‖𝑃‖ denote the number of 
profiles contained in the POSET P.  LPOM0 approximates the height of each profile to a weighted 
average of its height when the block of incomparable profiles are merged above it, and a weighted 
average of its height when the block of incomparable profiles is merged below it.  
 
  ℎ𝑎𝑣(𝑎(𝑘))  ≅  
‖𝑂‖
‖𝑂‖+‖𝐹‖





In (8), the first product represents the height of  𝑎(𝑘) if U is merged below it (the sum of profiles 
in O and U) and is weighted by the probability of such arrangement, that is, the share of all spots 
available for U that are actually below 𝑎(𝑘). Similarly, the second product represents the height 
of 𝑎(𝑘) if U is merged above it (just the number of profiles in O) weighted by the share of spots 
available above 𝑎(𝑘). For a discussion on the possible distortions of this approximation see 
Brüggemann and Carlsen (2011).  
The quantity in (8) is, therefore, our partial order-derived synthetic indicator for each group of 
indicators identified in the section about data. LPOM0 of user defined datasets can be performed 
online on www.PyHasse.org.  
 
3.3 Modeling and model comparison 
The transformation of data on national average SWB in OECD countries (see section on data) 
made our response variable an ordinal discrete variable with three or seven response categories. 
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The covariates built with LPOM0 in the previous section are continuous variables. An appropriate 
regression model for ordinal dependent variables is the ordered logistic regression or 
proportional odds model (McCullagh 1988), provided that the relationship between all pairs of 
outcome groups is the same (hence, the proportionality of odds); in that case, a single set of 
regression coefficients can be used to describe the whole set. Some tests to check if this 
assumption holds are available, including the score test (Greene 2011) the Wolfe-Gould test 
(Wolfe and Gould 1998) and the Brant test (Brant 1990), but they are known to be “anti-
conservative” and to frequently lead to reject the assumption (O’Connell 2006, p. 26), particularly 
when the circumstances are not ideal, like in the case of small sample size or when the set of 
covariates is large. If the assumption does not hold, the multinomial logistic model (Greene 2011) 
estimates a different set of coefficients for each outcome group. Given the inherent complexity of 
interpretation of the multinomial logistic model, the models presented in the results section are, 
in general, ordered logistic models. For each model, we provide the results of the score test, the 
Wolfe-Gould test and the Brant test, in order to discuss their compliance with the proportionality 
of odds assumption. All the main models in tables 5-8 have also been estimated as multinomial 
logistic models to cross-check the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients; for the 
sake of brevity, the results are not provided, but any relevant discrepancy with the ordered 
logistic models will be mentioned. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Preparing and performing dimensional reduction 
In this subsection, we present the results of the first two steps of our work. In order to keep our 
exposition as compact as possible, we will only include the Hasse diagrams and the POSAC 
outputs for those groups of indicators that could not be reduced to a single dimension without 
dropping some variables. Hasse diagrams and POSAC outputs for the remaining groups of 
indicators can be found in the supplementary material. Figure 3 and 5 represent, respectively, the 
POSAC output and the Hasse diagram of 34 OECD member countries based on their profiles in 
five indicators that the OECD calls “context indicators”. As anticipated earlier, this is the least 
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homogeneous group in the OECD-DSI and, as expected, incomparability is very high: we have 
just three levels for 34 profiles, several countries are incomparable to all others and the POSAC 
output is mostly aligned along the L axis. One could argue that there is no single underlying 
construct linking all five of these indicators. We drop household disposable income and net 
migration from the group on the grounds that they are significantly correlated and they describe 
a dynamic that is probably captured just as well by GDP. The resulting set of three indicators is 
more homogeneous: fertility, marriages and civil partnerships and old age support rate together 
provide hints on some important demographic characteristics of a country (e.g. about age 
distribution) and those demographic characteristics in turn indicate some sort of potential 
sustainability of formal and informal welfare systems and, therefore, sustainability of income in 
the log term. Figure 4 and figure 6 show the POSAC output and the Hasse diagram of this reduced 
set of three indicators. We now have seven levels and a more complex POSAC output with some 
alignment to the J axis as well. Remarkably, some strong and apparently solid economies like 
Germany, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland get very poor scores. This result will be commented 






FIGURE 3  POSAC of OECD member 




FIGURE 4  POSAC of OECD member 












Profiles ordered according to self-sufficiency indicators37 show reasonable comparability, are 
organized around four levels38 and, consequently, a complete ranking based on self-sufficiency 
as defined in the OECD-DSI appears reasonable. However, the degree of incomparability should 
not be overlooked: in our ranking, among the countries with average-to-low levels of self-
sufficiency, some allow long retirement periods but have high unemployment rates (e.g. Greece, 
Spain, Italy, France and Belgium) while others have reasonable unemployment rates but allow a 
very short retirement period (Mexico, Chile, Korea or Japan). A complete ranking will therefore 
assume that, based on the OECD indicators, these two factors can compensate each other in terms 
of resulting self-sufficiency.  
The five equity indicators in OECD-DSI produce a good degree of comparability: we have six 
levels for the 34 countries in the Hasse diagram39, and the POSAC output shows long chains of 
comparable profiles organized in three or four groups40. Broadly speaking, some countries (like 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Korea) have low levels of income inequality and poverty, 
but only 57% of their unemployed population, on average, qualifies for out-of-work benefits. At 
the opposite, Australia, Spain, Portugal and the United States have greater income inequality and 
poverty but, on average, 84% of their unemployed population get the benefits. All in all, the five 
equity indicators can reasonably be reduced to a single dimension. 
 
 
                                                     
37 See Figure 1 of supplementary material. 
38 See Figure 3 of supplementary material. 
39 See Figure 2 of supplementary material. 





FIGURE 7  POSAC of OECD member countries 




FIGURE 8  POSAC of OECD member countries 
based on four “Health indicators” 
 
Figure III-0-9 






FIGURE 9  Hasse diagram of OECD member countries based on four “Health indicators” 
 
The original set of five health indicators produces six levels in the Hasse diagram in figure 9 but 
half of the levels have just one or two members and the overall amount of incomparability is high. 
The POSAC output in figure 7 is correspondingly aligned, in two different groups, parallel to the 
L axis. We conclude that it is not reasonable to look for a single underlying “health” factor behind 
all five indicators. The best results in terms of comparability, if we sacrifice one variable, are 
obtained by dropping suicide rate (figures 8 and 10): the number of levels in the Hasse diagram 
does not increase, but comparability grows and we obtain long chains of comparable profiles as 
the new POSAC output illustrates. The main source of the remaining incomparability is due to 
public health expenditure and public health coverage: countries clustered around the bottom 
right corner have high public expenditure and, sometimes, low levels of coverage, while countries 
near the top left corner tend towards universal coverage.The set of four social cohesion 
indicators41 can be represented in a Hasse diagram with six levels42, comparability is rather strong 
                                                     
41 The reader should keep in mind that the social cohesion indicators provided by OECD originate from surveys and 
report a subjective feeling of the respondent, so it could be appropriate to define this as “perception of social 
cohesion”. 
42 See Figure 6 of supplementary material. 
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and that is reflected in the POSAC output, provided with the additional material43. Two groups 
of countries with average-to-low social cohesion are less aligned with the J axis: Turkey, Israel, 
Slovak Republic and Mexico have poor rankings in perception of personal safety from crime and 
good rankings in confidence in institutions. At the opposite, Slovenia, Iceland, Japan and, to a 
lesser degree, Spain, have good rankings in personal safety but poor rankings in confidence in 
institutions. Our interpretation is that these are two different paths for communities suffering 
from some dysfunction to stay away from the bottom of the social cohesion ranking: soft power 
(less conflict and less discipline) and hard power (more conflict and more discipline). Their 
incomparability means that the set of OECD indicators cannot intrinsically lead to choose one 
model over the other.  
The four indicators on pollution and consumption of non-renewable resources (cnrr) can be 
represented in a Hasse diagram with four levels44 and the degree of comparability is low. As 
illustrated by the POSAC output in the supplementary materials45, a rather large group of 
countries (Slovak Republik, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Korea and Turkey) have a very 
limited production of municipal waste but high concentrations of particulate. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, Ireland, New Zealand and Denmark have low concentrations of particulate but 
produce high amounts of municipal waste. The link between the indicators and the underlying 
latent variable in this case is inconsistent. We will provide an example of a more consistent 
formulation of this environmental regressor in the supplementary material, appendix A.1. In any 
case, the two variants of the regressor provide almost identical results in models46.  
The four indicators on green policies and production (gpp) create a Hasse diagram with just four 
levels47. The amount of incomparability is not so high to exclude that this category of indicators 
can be related to a single underlying construct but, as the POSAC output shows48, we have to deal 
with groups of countries with very different situations. A cluster of OECD member states (Korea, 
                                                     
43 See Figure 5 of supplementary material. 
44 See Figure 7 of supplementary material. 
45 See Figure 8 of supplementary material. 
46 See Table 1 of supplementary material 
47 See Figure 9 of supplementary material. 
48 See Figure 10 of supplementary material. 
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Luxembourg, Netherlands, Australia) have good scores in wastewater treatment and, sometimes, 
in environmental taxation, but the share of energy produced from renewable resources is low, 
ceteris paribus. Other countries, at the opposite (like Iceland, Chile, Slovenia and Portugal) rely on 
larger shares of renewable energy but they either treat much less than 70% of their wastewater or 
they have little environmental taxation or both.  
The final remarks concern two sets of indicators of relational and non-relational uses of time. The 
first set features very high levels of incomparability49: based on available indicators, the idea that 
we can rely on a latent construct about relationality in time use is doubtful. As a matter of fact, 
there is much more difference in how time use is allocated between different relational activities 
than in the average amount of time dedicated to relationality in different OECD countries. The 
set of non-relational uses of time is less affected by incomparability, with a Hasse diagram of four 
levels50, but as the POSAC output makes clear51, yet again the latent construct is barely visible 
from the available indicators. In the case of these last two sets of indicators, however, we are not 
going to reduce the number of variables in order to fine-tune the latent construct. As anticipated 
earlier, the two sets of indicators derived from the OECD-DTUI are presented here with the 
specific intent of testing the theory on relational goods. Indeed, time-use indicators and their 
relation with SWB make for an interesting field of enquiry, the development of which is at a much 
earlier stage compared to those concerning social or even environmental indicators. There is no 
theory on relationality and SWB to refer to if we find that some relational uses of time affect SWB 
and others don’t or do but in an unpredictable way. Precisely for this reason, we will estimate 
our models with indicators of relational and non-relational uses of time based on the full set of 
indicators. Furthermore, while commenting the results, we will make clear that more substantive 
evidence of a relation between time use and SWB could probably be found with better indicators, 
better data and a stronger theory.  
 
  
                                                     
49 See Figures 9 and 11 of supplementary material. 
50 See Figure 14 of supplementary material. 
51 See Figure 12 of supplementary material. 
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Table III-5. Pearson correlation coefficients -5Table III-0-5 
  TriSWB HeptaSWB gdp 
TriSWB 1 
  
HeptaSWB 0.9499* 1 
 
gdp 0.6053* 0.6213* 1 
dem† 0.4014* 0.3730* 0.1310 
selfsuf† 0.7014* 0.7640* 0.7197* 
equity† 0.3320 0.3697* 0.5340* 
health† 0.6505* 0.6948* 0.5983* 
soccohes† 0.7455* 0.7756* 0.7405* 
swb_0509 0.8436* 0.8846* 0.5194* 
cnrr† -0.2015 -0.2388  -0.1331 
gpp† 0.3060 0.3763* 0.3711* 
relational†  0.4805* 0.4929* 0.2723 
nonrelational† -0.4796* -0.6053* -0.5595* 
* p<0.05 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation coefficients between the nine regressors built through 
dimensional reduction thanks to the method of local partial order model (identified with a 
dagger) plus one lag term (swb_0509) and three other variables: GDP per capita (gdp), a tripartite 
discrete indicator of SWB (TriSWB) and a heptapartite discrete indicator of SWB (HeptaSWB). 
These coefficients are the logical conclusion of our process of dimensionality reduction. The 24 
social indicators collected by OECD can be reduced to five, while strictly controlling the levels of 
comparability; the resulting indicators are generally correlated with the indicators of SWB but the 
correlation is particularly strong in the case of self-sufficiency and social cohesion and weak or 
absent in the case of equity. In our preliminary analysis, we had found that average-to-low levels 
of self-sufficiency and social cohesion, as defined by the OECD indicators, are compatible with 
different unbalanced policy approaches. In other words, mediocre results in terms of self-
sufficiency may come from less unemployment and shorter retirement or more unemployment 
and longer retirement, while mediocre social cohesion may still be attained by dysfunctional 
communities exercising soft power or hard power. The OECD indicators do not inherently lead 
to choose one model over the other in these couples of unbalanced approaches. However, the 
correlation coefficients with SWB after the dimensional reduction are rather strong, meaning that 




1) balanced approaches seem definitely better; 
2) both unbalanced approaches to self-sufficiency seem to allow at least some wellbeing; 
3) both unbalanced approaches to social cohesion seem to allow at least some wellbeing 
 
A number of environmental indicators have been reduced to two: an indicator of pollution and 
unsustainable consumption and an indicator of green economy and policy. The correlation with 
SWB is null or marginal, suggesting that environmental policies might have no perceptible effect 
on SWB in the OECD countries or, if they have one, it is not captured by a standard set of 
environmental indicators. Several time use indicators have been reduced to two dimensions that 
are somewhat correlated with SWB: in the case of relational uses of time, the correlation is positive 
but weak, whereas in the case of non-relational uses of time it is negative and stronger. As 
expected, the lag term is the best correlate to SWB indicators. Table 5 presents two more elements 
worth mentioning. First, none of the indicators is a particularly accurate predictor of SWB except, 
possibly, the lag term. This is consistent with the hypothesis that SWB is multidimensional. 
Second, GDP per capita is a marginally worse predictor of only a few other indicators that, 
incidentally, correlate very well with it. This finding seems to suggest that our perception of well-
being may consist of more than just GDP, but “beyond GDP” effects will probably point to 
adjusting, not dramatically overturning, GDP-based policy decisions.    
 
4.2 Models 
Tables 6 and 7 present 12 ordered logit models of SWB based on the social indicators built from 
the OECD-DSI, at times completed with GDP per capita and the lag term of SWB. Odd numbers 
indicate models in which the dependent variable (TriSWB) has three possible outcomes. Models 
indicated with even numbers have the same set of independent variables as the model to their 
left, but the dependent variable (HeptaSWB) has seven possible outcomes. Models (1-4) are 
straightforward estimates of SWB using the full OECD-DSI dataset, with or without the lag term. 
Models (5-12) are more parsimonious models obtained with forward and backward stepwise 
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selection of the regressors. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)52 statistic shows that 
including all social variables as in models (1-4) increases complexity without great improvements 
in model fit. The tests on the proportionality of odds assumption are frequently discordant but 
coefficient signs of the statistically significant regressors are consistent throughout all models and 
consistent with estimates from multinomial logit models that we do not include for brevity. 
 
  
                                                     
52 See Greene (2011, pg. 160); BIC is a criterion for model selection that balances the likelihood of the model with the 
number of parameters in it. A model with a lower BIC should be preferred over a similar model with a higher BIC as 
the introduction of additional parameters in the second model did not provide sufficient improvements in likelihood.  
118 
 
Table III-6. Ordered logit models with social Table III-0-6 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB 
dem 0.126** 0.0829* 0.176** 0.147*** 0.215** 0.104** 
 (0.0616) (0.0431) (0.0841) (0.0537) (0.0989) (0.0454) 
selfsuf 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.140* 0.159***   
 (0.0619) (0.0502) (0.0742) (0.0607)   
equity -0.0359 -0.0304 0.0151 0.0138   
 (0.0534) (0.0420) (0.0844) (0.0486)   
health 0.00200 0.0259 -0.133 -0.0836 -0.193* -0.0441 
 (0.0549) (0.0457) (0.0991) (0.0572) (0.117) (0.0504) 
soccohes 0.120* 0.115** 0.115 0.0915   
 (0.0646) (0.0551) (0.100) (0.0685)   
swb_0509   0.238** 0.211*** 0.275** 0.243*** 
   (0.112) (0.0576) (0.110) (0.0601) 
gdp     0.315** 0.106*** 
     (0.157) (0.0395) 
Constant cut1 3.388** -0.865 9.985** 3.806* 17.17*** 5.795*** 
 (1.560) (1.327) (3.990) (1.994) (6.593) (2.200) 
Constant cut2 6.990*** 1.745* 18.41** 7.400*** 26.27*** 9.117*** 
 (2.149) (1.016) (7.493) (2.060) (10.09) (2.422) 
Constant cut3  3.107***  9.438***  10.61*** 
  (1.156)  (2.391)  (2.606) 
Constant cut4  5.193***  12.77***  13.15*** 
  (1.423)  (3.006)  (2.997) 
Constant cut5  6.906***  17.22***  17.60*** 
  (1.627)  (4.168)  (4.403) 
Constant cut6  9.946***  21.46***  21.58*** 
  (1.996)  (4.728)  (4.885) 
       
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 
       
STATISTICS             
Log-likelihood -17.20 -38.43 -10.87 -27.15 -10.56 -30.07 
LR Chi^2 test 37.35 45.50 50.01 68.06 50.63 62.23 
Pseudo R^2 0.521 0.372 0.697 0.556 0.706 0.509 
BIC 59.08 115.65 49.95 96.62 42.28 95.41 
       
TESTS OF PROPORTIONALITY OF ODDS ACROSS RESPONSE CATEGORIES  (P>Chi^2)  
Wolfe-Gould 0.002 0.000 0.020 0.017 0.192 0.207 
Brant 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.650 1.000 
Score 0.009 0.041 0.045 0.310 0.410 0.587 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table III-7. Ordered logit models with social regressors TablIII-0-7 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB 
dem 0.137** 0.116*** 0.142** 0.121***   
 (0.0666) (0.0446) (0.0644) (0.0435)   
selfsuf 0.120* 0.139** 0.135** 0.162***   
 (0.0679) (0.0562) (0.0648) (0.0544)   
soccohes 0.0465 0.0612   0.0988 0.115** 
 (0.0630) (0.0524)   (0.0700) (0.0554) 
equity     -0.0203 -0.0218 
     (0.0573) (0.0409) 
swb_0509 0.158** 0.176*** 0.167*** 0.182*** 0.166*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0479) (0.0611) (0.0463) (0.0544) (0.0432) 
Constant cut1 7.737*** 2.899* 7.808*** 2.833* 5.131*** 1.428 
 (2.547) (1.565) (2.464) (1.533) (1.890) (1.468) 
Constant cut2 13.73*** 6.361*** 13.48*** 6.313*** 9.661*** 4.272*** 
 (4.404) (1.673) (4.160) (1.627) (2.925) (1.347) 
Constant cut3  8.286***  8.237***  5.560*** 
  (1.956)  (1.894)  (1.473) 
Constant cut4  11.22***  11.22***  7.778*** 
  (2.380)  (2.364)  (1.804) 
Constant cut5  15.05***  14.59***  10.65*** 
  (3.374)  (3.150)  (2.421) 
Constant cut6  19.32***  18.65***  14.56*** 
  (4.001)  (3.753)  (3.013) 
       
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 
       
STATISTICS             
Log-likelihood -12.07 -28.27 -12.34 -28.99 -15.11 -33.44 
LR Chi^2 test 47.61 65.83 47.06 64.39 41.53 55.48 
Pseudo R^2 0.664 0.538 0.656 0.526 0.579 0.453 
BIC 45.30 91.80 42.32 89.72 47.85 98.62 
       
TESTS OF PROPORTIONALITY OF ODDS ACROSS RESPONSE CATEGORIES (P>Chi^2) 
Wolfe-Gould 0.094 0.423 0.099 0.382 0.088 0.075 
Brant 0.518 1.000 0.241 0.000 0.266 0.000 
Score 0.159 0.733 0.145 0.713 0.131 0.306 
              
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table III-8. Ordered logit models with social and environmental regressorsTable III-0-8 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
VARIABLES TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB 
dem 0.203* 0.0914* 0.123 0.121** 0.123 0.128**   
 (0.121) (0.0510) (0.0869) (0.0542) (0.0799) (0.0519)   
selfsuf   0.154* 0.220*** 0.174** 0.238***   
   (0.0807) (0.0722) (0.0754) (0.0694)   
equity       -0.0180 -0.0249 
       (0.0665) (0.0442) 
health -0.184 -0.00786       
 (0.144) (0.0538)       
soccohes   0.0717 0.0487   0.150* 0.150** 
   (0.0870) (0.0708)   (0.0884) (0.0653) 
swb_0509 0.294** 0.289*** 0.221** 0.246*** 0.228** 0.251*** 0.201*** 0.211*** 
 (0.131) (0.0764) (0.102) (0.0719) (0.0970) (0.0693) (0.0745) (0.0569) 
gdp 0.313* 0.112***       
 (0.169) (0.0421)       
cnrr -0.0609 -0.0810 -0.0672 -0.146** -0.0931 -0.152*** -0.0464 -0.0766* 
 (0.0780) (0.0502) (0.0765) (0.0581) (0.0762) (0.0570) (0.0653) (0.0461) 
gpp -0.0289 -0.0741 -0.112 -0.0900* -0.0970 -0.0866* -0.103* -0.0670 
 (0.0778) (0.0513) (0.0717) (0.0502) (0.0637) (0.0491) (0.0627) (0.0419) 
Constant cut1 16.09** 4.270* 7.178** 0.315 6.610** 0.207 4.340* -0.180 
 (7.213) (2.422) (3.658) (1.875) (3.112) (1.858) (2.402) (1.779) 
Constant cut2 25.76** 8.181*** 15.28** 4.562** 14.01** 4.450** 10.20*** 3.070* 
 (11.28) (2.735) (6.905) (2.036) (5.658) (1.971) (3.816) (1.647) 
Constant cut3  9.918***  7.234***  7.094***  4.566*** 
  (2.942)  (2.337)  (2.261)  (1.745) 
Constant cut4  12.56***  11.21***  11.19***  6.955*** 
  (3.349)  (2.938)  (2.902)  (2.044) 
Constant cut5  18.26***  16.35***  15.79***  10.93*** 
  (5.178)  (4.521)  (4.181)  (3.044) 
Constant cut6  22.37***  21.20***  20.59***  14.95*** 
  (5.691)  (5.234)  (4.939)  (3.576) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
STATISTICS                 
Log-likelihood -10.08 -27.76 -10.04 -23.41 -10.41 -23.65 -12.58 -30.30 
LR Chî 2 test 50.04 64.32 50.12 73.04 49.39 72.54 45.05 59.24 
Pseudo R^2 0.713 0.537 0.714 0.609 0.704 0.605 0.642 0.494 
BIC 48.14 97.48 48.06 88.77 45.29 85.77 49.63 99.07 
TESTS OF PROPORTIONALITY OF ODDS ACROSS RESPONSE CATEGORIES (P>Chî 2) 
Wolfe-Gould 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.026 0.075 0.054 0.036 0.012 
Brant 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 0.377 0.000 
Score 0.349 0.556 0.083 0.420 0.300 0.008 0.127 0.377 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table III-9. Ordered logit models with social and time-use regressors Table III-0-9 
  (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
VARIABLES TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB 
dem 0.415 0.213** 0.0961 0.125** 0.0959 0.125**   
 (0.260) (0.0963) (0.0727) (0.0620) (0.0720) (0.0617)   
selfsuf   0.0942 0.138* 0.103 0.144**   
   (0.0810) (0.0745) (0.0786) (0.0713)   
equity       -0.0520 -0.0603 
       (0.0739) (0.0585) 
health -0.589 -0.199*       
 (0.406) (0.120)       
soccohes   0.0353 0.0230   0.0973 0.117 
   (0.0777) (0.0776)   (0.100) (0.0895) 
swb_0509 0.540* 0.403*** 0.140* 0.253*** 0.152** 0.260*** 0.152** 0.231*** 
 (0.309) (0.139) (0.0725) (0.0859) (0.0685) (0.0834) (0.0731) (0.0749) 
gdp 0.783 0.324**       
 (0.527) (0.152)       
relational 0.299 0.0658 0.0263 0.0124 0.0372 0.0178 -0.00793 0.0116 
 (0.216) (0.0797) (0.0902) (0.0730) (0.0853) (0.0705) (0.0888) (0.0662) 
nonrelational -0.155 -0.219* -0.0821 -0.225** -0.0856 -0.227** -0.107 -0.238** 
 (0.161) (0.132) (0.102) (0.104) (0.100) (0.103) (0.109) (0.107) 
         
Constant cut3  17.24**  6.135**  6.149**  2.024 
  (7.243)  (3.059)  (3.016)  (2.714) 
Constant cut4  21.00***  10.29***  10.40***  5.066* 
  (7.790)  (3.734)  (3.703)  (2.999) 
Constant cut5  31.62***  15.63***  15.66***  9.769** 
  (11.88)  (5.242)  (5.208)  (4.081) 
Constant cut6  38.00***  21.59***  21.56***  15.60*** 
  (13.03)  (6.456)  (6.424)  (4.990) 
Constant cut1 35.30 9.208 5.038* -0.912 5.086* -0.892 1.991 -3.532 
 (21.91) (5.731) (3.061) (2.710) (2.987) (2.679) (3.086) (3.016) 
Constant cut2 57.01* 15.04** 10.77** 3.542 10.83** 3.568 7.061* 0.321 
 (34.37) (6.974) (4.587) (2.880) (4.531) (2.843) (4.031) (2.738) 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
STATISTICS                 
Log-likelihood -8.027 -15.61 -10.46 -16.40 -10.56 -16.45 -11.32 -19.07 
LR Chî 2 test 38.96 62.29 34.09 60.71 33.88 60.62 32.36 55.37 
Pseudo R^2 0.708 0.666 0.620 0.649 0.616 0.648 0.588 0.592 
BIC 42.12 70.32 46.98 71.90 43.93 68.73 45.45 73.98 
TESTS OF PROPORTIONALITY OF ODDS ACROSS RESPONSE CATEGORIES (P>Chî 2)  
Wolfe-Gould 0.013 0.387 0.002 0.324 0.001 0.129 0.004 0.123 
Brant 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 - 1.000 - 
Score 0.072 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.017 0.000 0.056 0.006 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Self-sufficiency (selfsuf), social cohesion (soccohes) and GDP per capita (gdp) have consistently 
positive coefficients and tend to be significant in most models, but their statistical significance is 
reduced when they appear together, indicating that the information they provide might be 
partially redundant. The demographic variable (dem) is consistently significant and positive in 
all models. The coefficients of equity have erratic signs and they are never statistically significant. 
Health is usually not significant as well and tends to have an unexpected negative sign. Models 
(13-20) in table 8 are extensions of models (5-12) with the addition of two environmental 
regressors. The coefficients of the social regressors are generally stable (with a slight reduction of 
the significance of dem) so we can broadly confirm the results found above. The variable 
concerning the green economy and legislation (gpp) is never significant with a tendency of having 
an unexpected negative sign. The variable related to polluting and unsustainable consumption is 
negative but significant only in models with seven outcomes. The inconsistent significance of this 
regressor, along with its being uncorrelated with SWB indicators, suggests great caution; we will 
provide our interpretation in the discussion section. Models (21-28) in table 9 are a different 
extension of models (5-12), this time with the addition of relational and non-relational uses of 
time. The social regressors lose some significance, particularly in models with a response variable 
with three outcomes (TriSWB). This is not entirely surprising: both time use variables have decent 
or good correlation with other social variables and with GDP per capita (hence, part of the 
information can be thought as overlapping). The time use regressors themselves provide very 
different results. Relational use of time is non-significant in all models. At the opposite, non-
relational use of time is significant in models with the heptapartite response variable, and 
consistently negative in all models. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our findings are consistent with the view, shared by many, that SWB must indeed be 
multidimensional: no single factor, be it GDP or beyond GDP, is a particularly accurate predictor 
of national average SWB, if taken alone. Actually, as table 5 showed, GDP still works better than 
many proposed “beyond GDP” factors and not dramatically worse than the best of them. We 
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didn’t test all possible “beyond GDP” factors, though, and some not covered by our work might 
prove more clearly superior to GDP. 
After moving from an unidimensional to a multidimensional approach, we found that national 
SWB can be predicted with reasonable accuracy by making use of some parsimonious selection 
of three regressors representing self-sufficiency, social cohesion and GDP per capita53. As the three 
regressors seem to reduce each other’s statistical significance, they arguably convey much shared 
information; in fact, including all three in a model is not justified by the improvement of the 
model. Our interpretation of this block of variables is that income stability in all phases of the life 
cycle (i.e. self-sufficiency) and contained social conflict produce an environment in which a higher 
average SWB is more likely. Furthermore, self-sufficiency and social cohesion combined explain 
national SWB better than GDP per capita. 
This group of regressors has an interesting counterpoint in demography. Stable, fertile families 
in a dynamic demographic environment are frequently associated with relatively higher national 
SWB. In some circumstances, countries have both large networks of family and solidarity ties and 
high levels of self-sufficiency and social cohesion, a context that our models indicate as the best 
possible in terms of well-being. More frequently, countries seem to trade demographic dynamism 
with self-sufficiency and social cohesion and vice versa. The relation between demography and 
development has been studied for a long time; in this case we find a relation between 
demography and subjective well-being that could also be an important parameter for policy 
decisions. Policymakers should be aware that social cohesion and income stability, combined as 
they frequently are, are likely to be more relevant than demography in lifting the perception of 
well-being but, in the absence of demographic dynamism and particularly in the long run, the 
level of SWB is not sustainable and it is likely going to decrease.  
Equity is not correlated with SWB and provides no useful information to predict its national level. 
Based on the OECD indicators combined in our equity regressor, we must conclude that, in OECD 
well-being data, there are no signs of aversion for inequality or preference for inequality-reducing 
social transfers. Since equity had at least some weak correlation with SWB in table 4, we suppose 
                                                     
53 As defined in the data section of this work. 
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that any effect of equity is better explained by other variables, like self-sufficiency or social 
cohesion.   
When other social regressors are considered, health is not significant or weakly significant but 
negative. There are several possible explanations for this and all should be empirically tested. In 
any case, given the results, other socio-economic factors are much more likely to directly affect 
the perception of well-being at a national level.  
Our attempt of expanding the best social models with environmental indicators provided mixed 
results. We found no evidence that green policies and the green economy (as they could be 
inferred from the available indicators) have any relation with SWB. The quality and the amount 
of data are relatively poor and future research could point to green policies (and the appropriate 
indicators) that are more immediately perceived by the population. This notwithstanding, the 
link between environmental-friendly development and SWB is not as generalized and evident as 
one might expect. Our indicator on non-sustainable production and consumption, instead, works 
rather well in some models with seven potential outcomes, in spite of having no correlation with 
the indicators of SWB. This could depend on some unidentified source of bias in the model or on 
the fact that, all other things being equal, pollution and non-sustainable consumption matter to 
SWB at least to some degree. In either case, the effect is much less direct than with other indicators 
and future research should probably assume that what exactly channels environmental issues 
into SWB effects is rather unclear when looking at standard indicators.  
The attempt of adding time-use indicators to social models provided more conclusive results. The 
amount of time dedicated to relational activities has no apparent connection with SWB in the 
OECD countries after social factors are taken into account. That is, more time devoted to social 
interaction does not correspond to more SWB unless the social context is better as well in terms 
of low levels of social conflict, a good disposition towards the others and widespread economic 
self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, a better social context corresponds to more SWB regardless of the 
amount of relational time so that, apparently, a socio-economic model of SWB is just as good 
without specific information about relational time. 
Our indicator of non-relational uses of time, instead, appears to be linked with national SWB, at 
least in models with seven potential outcomes: more time dedicated to these activities 
125 
 
corresponds to lower average national SWB. Two possible interpretations arise, particularly 
while trying to be consistent with the findings concerning the other time-use regressor. The first 
is that SWB may be affected by the quantity of non-relational time but, at the same time, by the 
quality rather than the quantity of relational time. The second is that some uses of time may be 
connected with national average SWB for reasons other than the production of relational goods. 
Either way, based on our results, there is no reason to expect that policies increasing the amount 
of relational time would have any effect on SWB.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Some authors claim that maximizing SWB is a more meaningful social objective than maximizing 
GDP and that other factors beyond income play a major role in defining well-being. In this work, 
we studied two issues connected with this claim, looking at the context of OECD member 
countries. We looked at the crowded category of proposed, “beyond GDP” policy-controlled 
factors, searching for evidence that some might be major drivers of national average SWB. We 
also compared any such effect with that of GDP, in order to evaluate if these factors have a better 
chance of leading to a maximization of SWB than GDP itself.  
In our analyses, we made use of Partial Order Methods that have been rarely (if ever), applied to 
this field of study. They seem particularly appropriate to the case, as SWB is generally theorized 
as strongly multidimensional while standard modeling strategies require a great deal of 
compromise when working with many potential regressors and non-trivial levels of 
multicollinearity. This approach can be applied to more well-being metrics and can be extended 
to much more complex conceptual models, providing an alternative to methods that sacrifice 
interpretability or lose control of compensation between different dimensions. 
Our results support the view that the national perception of well-being depends on a 
multidimensional set of determinants: GDP, just like any other “beyond GDP” indicator at our 
disposal, taken alone, explains little of SWB variability across countries. Even in multivariate 
models, we don’t have to explicitly include GDP in the set of regressors to obtain reasonable 
predictions. Nonetheless, after testing a rather vast field of alternative indicators, we found only 
two groups of variables that consistently anticipate higher national SWB: self-sufficiency and 
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social cohesion, demography and non-relational use of time. The two groups are not mutually 
exclusive, but they lead to conclusions that are better kept distinct. The first group, consisting of 
self-sufficiency and social cohesion, while being more accurate than GDP alone, is going to favor 
small or moderate adjustments to GDP-led policies rather than the kind of dramatic overturn that 
some expect from “beyond GDP” approaches. At the opposite, the second group might point to 
greater policy shifts but, at present, it is not particularly clear in which direction. Demography 
does respond, over long periods, to some policy decisions, but the time scale is clearly well 
beyond the reach of one government mandate. Time-use is probably manageable in shorter time 
spans through policy, but having to discard the role of relational time-use, we are left without a 
definite theory of why time-use matters and in which way. 
We also found SWB to be extremely persistent over long periods of time, and that more than a 
few conclusions in our models are based on the assumption that small differences in the average 
value of SWB are independent from cultural and linguistic differences that surveys cannot avoid. 
Even if this second reason for concern is left aside, the modest variability of well-being indicators 
in periods of ten or even fifteen years, makes the improvement of this indicator a very impervious 
target for policy-makers in the timespan of one mandate. 
Improving the current policy goals of governments with “beyond GDP” approaches seems a 
sensible intent. SWB, we argue, provides information that can be used to fine-tune the decisions 
of policymakers and put focus on factors like self-sufficiency that have an unquestionable effect 
on SWB but can be underestimated by GDP-driven approaches. However, we found no evidence 
that individual preferences look totally different if they are inferred from perceived well-being 
rather than from revealed preferences in a market system. On the contrary, based on our results, 
claims that SWB would lead to a paradigm shift and to an overturn of GDP-driven policies seem 
to linger on many ineffective indicators and on theories based on inconsistent factual evidence.  
As we reminded throughout the paper, other metrics of SWB might possibly provide different 
results and, maybe, other indicators in more complex model frameworks could ultimately 
identify as significant some specific elements of theories that we found ineffective. With this 
work, we have presented an approach that can hopefully support further research in that 
direction and help overcoming some multidimensionality issues. In the absence of stronger 
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evidence, though, we argue that SWB is unlikely to respond to many of the policies that “beyond 
GDP” literature is promoting and, consequently, well-being research should envision a more 
substantial paradigm change, shifting its attention to measures lying outside the hedonic sphere 
and unrelated to individual preferences, or focus on the less radical agenda of policy adjustment 
that emerges from individual preferences.  
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Policy decisions under severe informational limitations 
In the previous chapters, the complexity of decision-making has been represented in the form of 
the various legitimate preferences of the individuals in a population (Chapter I) or, rather, in 
different possible combinations of performance indicators that, once assembled, should represent 
an overall level of performance (Chapter II and III). In Chapter I, the multiplicity of goals was 
presented as a matter of fact of theoretical relevance (collective choice is based on individual 
preferences by definition); in Chapter II, multiple criteria are considered as a diagnostic tool to 
ponder the consequences of using a single criterion; in Chapter III, the complexity of a multi-level 
dataset is represented by the multidimensionality of each of its domains. In all cases, what 
prevented a straightforward reduction of complexity was the assumption that the scores of each 
alternative under different criteria defy aggregation unless substantial exogenous information 
allows it.  
The circumstances in which this is relevant seem to go beyond those illustrated in this thesis. In 
the field of collective choice, one can think of many scenarios in which a simple functional relation 
between the ranking of an alternative in all individual preferences and its ranking in the collective 
preference doesn’t seem such a good idea. Think of decision-making in a country in which 
preferences on fundamental issues are strictly correlated with ethnic self-identification and 
minorities know in advance that they are set to systematically lose majority decisions and have 
little incentive in participating to collective decision-making. All solutions that apply to these 
cases implicitly assume that the balance between different individual orderings cannot be 
established exclusively as a consequence of the frequency of its appearance in the population. 
About the same argument can be made for all processes in which local interests have to be 
balanced with general interests and bargaining solutions are not effective. In the more general 
case in which criteria do not necessarily consist of individual preferences, direct trade-offs 
between criteria can easily appear vacuous, either when the actual trade-off is not yet known and 
thus informational limitations are temporary, or when it is intrinsically impossible to weigh down 
an exact trade-off because it depends on an unpredictable future state of matters, on uncertain 
value judgements, on non-linear and unknown processes. For instance, even though we may 
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admit some trade-off between growth and environmental quality when both are within a given 
range, outside of that range any trade-off may be extremely unpredictable as a consequence of 
feedbacks and non-linearities. 
In all these cases, the complexity of the decision-making process, which corresponds to multiple 
objectives and concerns, results in conflicting orderings in which some alternatives dominate 
others and some are just incomparable. The partially ordered set of alternatives derived from the 
Pareto criterion, though, represents more than a failed attempt at ordering: it provides 
information on those conflicts between alternative orderings, alternative interests and possible 
solution. Specifically, the height of an alternative in this partially ordered set varies between a 
maximum and a minimum in a range that represents all possible ranks assumed by that 
alternative depending on any meaningful package of exogenous information that, for instance, 
endows criteria with weights.  
This approach is unlikely to provide a major alternative to the standard approaches at decision-
making: the information that it assumes as unavailable is sufficiently important that it may 
appear as unacceptable to even start a decision-making process without having it secured. At the 
same time, a wide variety of situations may require a decision no matter what and, in that case, 
the approach discussed in this work provides a unified and rigorous method as an alternative to 













Figure A-0-1 Figure A-0-2 
FIGURE 1 POSAC of OECD member 
countries based on five “Selfsuf indicators” 
FIGURE 2 POSAC of OECD member countries 





FIGURE 3  Hasse diagram of OECD member countries based on five “Selfsuf indicators” 
 
 
Figure 9 - POSAC of equity indicators
















































Figure 8 - POSAC of selfsuf indicators
























































FIGURE 5 POSAC of OECD member 
countries based on four “Soccohes indicators” 
 
Figure 15 - POSAC of soccohes indicators




















































FIGURE 6 Hasse diagram of OECD member countries based on four “Soccohes indicators” 
 
 
Figure A-0-7 Figure A-0-8 
FIGURE 7 POSAC of OECD member 
countries based on five “Cnrr indicators” 
FIGURE 8 POSAC of OECD member countries 




















































Figure 18 -  POSAC of gpp indicators






















































FIGURE 10 Hasse diagram of OECD member countries based on “Gpp indicators” 
 
 
Figure A-11 Figure A-12 
FIGURE 11 POSAC of OECD member 
countries based on “relational indicators” 
FIGURE 12 POSAC of OECD member countries 
based on “Nonrelational indicators” 
 
POSAC Profile Plot


































































































FIGURE 15 POSAC of cnrr indicators (with 




FIGURE 16   Hasse diagram based on cnrr indicators (with CO2 replacing Particulate) 
 
Figure 17 - POSAC of cnrr indicators

















































The four indicators on pollution and consumption of non-renewable resources (cnrr) including CO2 can be 
represented in a Hasse diagram with six levels and the degree of comparability is good. As illustrated by 
the POSAC output above, some countries with average to poor environmental performances (Mexico, 
Chile, France, Italy, Turkey and Spain) have a mild climate and relatively large agricultural sectors that 
consume water and produce pesticides; for arguably different reasons they also have a larger production 
of municipal waste. Other countries with comparably mediocre performances (Iceland, Estonia, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Finland and Czech Republic) have better results in these indicators but produce a 





Table A-1. Ordered logit models with social and environmental regressors (including CO2) Table A-1 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
VARIABLES TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB TriSWB HeptaSWB 
dem 0.234* 0.0973* 0.124 0.124** 0.132* 0.131**   
 (0.123) (0.0523) (0.0849) (0.0535) (0.0739) (0.0512)   
selfsuf   0.137* 0.225*** 0.161*** 0.248***   
   (0.0815) (0.0754) (0.0745) (0.0724)   
equity       0.00611 -0.0328 
       (0.0636) (0.0472) 
health -0.215 -0.00350       
 (0.151) (0.0540)       
soccohes   0.100 0.0566   0.155* 0.159** 
   (0.0815) (0.0655)   (0.0865) (0.0661) 
swb_0509 0.282** 0.306*** 0.219** 0.259*** 0.212*** 0.264*** 0.200*** 0.216*** 
 (0.115) (0.0815) (0.0985) (0.0738) (0.0803) (0.0702) (0.0744) (0.0571) 
gdp 0.342* 0.122***       
 (0.178) (0.0434)       
cnrr 0.0759 -0.100* 0.0304 -0.153** 0.00212 -0.160** 0.0595 -0.0833 
 (0.104) (0.0570) (0.105) (0.0658) (0.0903) (0.0652) (0.0903) (0.0529) 
gpp -0.0165 -0.0633 -0.118 -0.0735 -0.0859 -0.0676 -0.126* -0.0512 
 (0.0763) (0.0493) (0.0793) (0.0488) (0.0656) (0.0469) (0.0725) (0.0418) 
Constant cut1 19.02** 5.641** 8.880** 2.056 8.172** 2.031 6.191** 0.698 
 (8.282) (2.399) (4.058) (1.740) (3.206) (1.697) (2.730) (1.560) 
Constant cut2 28.30** 9.300*** 16.87** 6.021*** 14.79*** 5.962*** 11.85*** 3.672** 
 (12.04) (2.821) (7.129) (2.051) (5.237) (1.959) (4.095) (1.493) 
Constant cut3  11.09***  8.446***  8.377***  5.130*** 
  (3.087)  (2.349)  (2.248)  (1.638) 
Constant cut4  13.82***  12.63***  12.67***  7.547*** 
  (3.541)  (3.158)  (3.081)  (1.953) 
Constant cut5  19.89***  17.71***  17.12***  11.53*** 
  (5.562)  (4.684)  (4.314)  (3.003) 
Constant cut6  23.84***  22.26***  21.60***  15.41*** 
  (6.011)  (5.306)  (4.966)  (3.510) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
STATISTICS                 
Log-likelihood -10.13 -27.43 -10.42 -23.75 -11.26 -24.14 -12.61 -30.38 
LR Chî 2 test 49.95 64.99 49.36 72.34 47.68 71.57 44.99 59.09 
Pseudo R^2 0.711 0.542 0.703 0.604 0.679 0.597 0.641 0.493 
BIC 48.23 96.81 48.81 89.46 47.00 86.74 49.70 99.22 
TESTS OF PROPORTIONALITY OF ODDS ACROSS RESPONSE CATEGORIES (P>Chî 2) 
Wolfe-Gould 0.002 0.004 0.028 0.073 0.010 0.016 0.004 0.002 
Brant 1.000 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.133 
Score 0.192 0.250 0.031 0.013 0.019 0.008 0.068 0.170 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
 
